DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 187 619 SO 012 591

AUTHOR Falk, Richard A.
TITLE A World Order Perspective on Authoritarian Tendencies. World Order Models Project. Working Paper Number Ten.
INSTITUTION Institute for World Order, New York, N.Y.
PUB DATE 80
NOTE 70p.; Maps throughout document may not reproduce clearly from EDRS in paper copy.
AVAILABLE FROM Institute for World Order, Inc., 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 ($1.50, quantity discounts available)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Authoritarianism; Capitalism; Developed Nations; Developing Nations; Global Approach; *Government (Administrative Body); *Political Science; Socialism; Totalitarianism

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses five main patterns of authoritarian government rule that are currently prominent in international society. The first pattern is "Brazilianization" which has evolved as a model for rightist, capitalist elites in the more industrialized countries of the Third World (e.g. Iran, Indonesia, and Argentina). A common feature of these countries is to seek integration into the world trade and money markets including a receptivity to multinational corporations. The paper then turns to a discussion of "Leninization" which is manifest in every Third World socialist society whether it looks to Moscow, Peking, or itself for primary guidance. A third kind of authoritarian tendency examined is "Praetorianization" which occurs in conditions of relatively little industrial development. Such governance patterns can be linked with either capitalist or socialist states but are characterized more by the praetorian exercise of state power than by the ideological orientation of the regime. Following this is a brief appraisal of an authoritarian tendency in the social North known as "Stalinization." Here, the central phenomenon is the persistance of Stalinist modes of rule in the Soviet Union and its East European allies. A short discussion then follows about the fifth pattern "Trilateralization" and the loss of confidence in the capacity of democratic governance to do the job in the developed countries of North America. The paper concludes with a discussion of the linkage of these five authoritarian tendencies to world order prospects. (Author/RM)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED187619

A World Order Perspective on Authoritarian Tendencies

RICHARD A. FALK

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Christine Sylvester

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

SP 012 591

WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT
WORKING PAPER NUMBER TEN
1980

© Institute for World Order, Inc., 777 United Nations Plaza,
New York, New York 10017, U.S.A., 1980.

Filmset in India by Oxford Printcraft India, Ltd., Delhi.
Printed in the United States.

A WORLD ORDER PERSPECTIVE ON AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES*

Richard FALK†

The paper starts from the premise that because nation-states are the most important actors in the international arena, and also because world order both feeds on and feeds national political situations, a close look into the internal life (including the structures of power and governance) of the states is indispensable for an understanding of the existing world order and for evolving a strategy for changing it into one more just and peaceful. It is concerned about the growing global trend toward authoritarian regimes - mostly in the countries of the South but also in those of the North. It classifies authoritarian governance into various types, traces the roots and causes of each, uncovers the links of each with external powers, and spells out their impact on world order. It then identifies the actors whose help can be recruited in the endeavour to restructure the existing world order, and suggests concrete steps that can be taken in that behalf.

I. Importance of the nation-state and its management of internal affairs

Approaches to world order that neglect the internal life of sovereign states tend to be sterile. The main social forces active in human affairs are concentrated within national boundaries, although these are increasingly linked to many forms of transnational networks of influence. More significantly,

*In the course of working on this paper for two years I have been helped by many comments on earlier versions, especially by two sets of discussions at meetings of the World Order Models Project in 1977-1978. I want to thank, in particular, Fouad Ajami, Graciela Chichilnisky, Kenneth Paul Erikson, Ali Mazrui, Saul Mendlovitz and Ralph Schoenman; also Ruth Ann Johansen for research assistance, mapmaking, and goodwill; and, finally, June Garson for patience, precision, and a gracious demeanor - R.F.

†*Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., U.S.A.*

virtually all governments as the principal actors in global arenas are organized around the postulates of statist logic, including an acceptance of a system of national security based on military prowess. Furthermore, the vast discrepancies in national endowment, capability, and potential are a principal source of world order disaffection, especially to the extent that these discrepancies seem racially and regionally specific.

In essence, national political situations both *reflect* and *shape* the international context. Wider patterns of constraint and systems of control condition national options and interfere with the achievement of national autonomy. These various interferences arise from the hegemonical structure of international politics and are discussed beneath the rubric of 'neocolonialism'. Also, the distinct forms of national governance, whether or not themselves partially caused by external factors, in turn confine the range of global policy options that appear feasible at a particular time, and in a larger sense national outlooks control the agenda, direction and pace of global reform.

These generalizations seem relevant for any conception of world order, even if the sole objective is maximizing the stability of international relations, that is, eliminating threats of major disturbances or challenges to the international *status quo*. Increasingly, also, foreign policy for major state actors is a managerial venture carried on within such a world order framework of concern. In this regard, such apparently normative issues as world poverty, North–South adjustment, East–West relations, human rights, arms control, are 'handled' by reference to this generalized understanding of what will keep the international system from economic, military, or ecological breakdown. But sensitivity to domestic constituencies, bureaucratic pressures, and national interests of a short-term variety severely limits the discretion of even enlightened national leaders (that is, those with a longer-term vision of national well-being based on the evolution of an acceptable form of world order – one perceived as fair as well as stable). And, besides, enlightened leaders are a rarity in powerful states because political processes, whether liberal or authoritarian, produce leaders whose credibility arises from their capacity to achieve short-term goals.

These short-term goals are shaped by selfish conceptions of personal and national interests, whether measured by dollars of export sales or jobs or inflation rates. Germany cannot be induced to forego jobs and profits from export sales of nuclear technology any more than the Soviet Union or the United States can be induced to forego a weapon innovation that promises some military advantage. The wider impact of state practice on human or world community well-being is largely neglected by policy-makers at the national level, despite the extent to which these considerations may be acknowledged in the rhetoric of national leaders. The reality of danger is

comprehended in words, but the governmental means and will to do something about it are missing.

At the same time, complicating this assessment, is the positive role of Third World governments in redressing the imbalances that are embodied in the colonial heritage and persist in a variety of newer imperial forms. Governments that protect their polity against outside intervention are acting to neutralize one source of distortion in the state system, even if such protection in some instances serves to insulate a particular repressive governance structure from humanizing pressures mounted from without. A normative balance between those considerations associated with self-determination/nonintervention, on the one side, and a human rights/democratic process, on the other, is elusive. Many human rights activists are preoccupied with mounting an interventionary strategy to liberate a particular repressed people, and fail to realize the systemic consequences of their advocacy and the precedent it might set if acted upon. For progressives, it is fine to subvert fascist regimes, but criminal to destabilize socialist regimes; for conservatives, the opposite is true. For one group, liberation movements are positive, CIA operations are criminal; for its adversaries, the opposite is true.

Even more fundamental from a world order perspective are trends in the ideology and character of national governance structures. The main trend line, although exhibiting some contradictory pulls, suggests an upsurge in the extent and severity of military-backed authoritarian rule in recent years, especially in the Third World. A subsidiary trend suggests the spread of bureaucratically centralized modes of authoritarian rule, whether associated with socialist or capitalist forms of economic organization. A second subsidiary trend, especially in the liberal democratic societies of the Trilateral sector of world society, involves the political implications of growing signs of societal decay and disturbance. These signs have prompted debate as to whether democratic polities remain governable in the North. The cumulative effect of these trends is to underscore the futility of expecting national governments to act as progressive agents of global reform. Such futility exists quite apart from the structural resistance that states as states put up to making changes that reduce their relative or absolute power, authority, and prestige. At present, the energy for global reform is mainly located in the populist sector, although it is reinforced by some transnational social forces, including the network of international institutions that comprise the United Nations.

Nevertheless, the state remains by far the most important actor on the world stage, and its relationship to various potential types of change is critical. The argument of this paper is that the quality of the governance structure, as it pertains to the way in which a government maintains order

and promotes justice within its boundaries, influences the manner in which it acts in external relations to the world. In particular, the substitution of highly coercive rule for consensual rule tends to inhibit the impact of those social forces that would move with the tides of history to build some sort of global community polity that would alone give promise that our future will not be beset by catastrophe on an unprecedented scale. For this reason, the global trend, manifest on the state level in all sectors of world society toward authoritarian rule is at once significant and discouraging. The reality of this trend in the Third World is especially discouraging as the states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America have the greatest stake in global reform. These states share a quest for a fairer international allocation of economic and psychological rewards, while at the same time emerging as principal defenders of sovereign rights, both for the legitimate reason of guarding their society against neocolonial disruption and for the dubious reason of insulating their domestic rule from outside criticism. As a result, the bureaucratic base of state power is expanding in scale and efficiency. The overall international atmosphere reflects this further evolution of statism.

II. Variants of authoritarianism

This paper attempts to portray the main variants of authoritarian rule that are currently prominent in international society. Emphasis is placed on the geographical distinction between North and South as descriptive of separate geopolitical settings, and on the distinction between capitalism and socialism as descriptive of the principal development alternatives, as well as establishing the major premise for the kind of link between a given government and the world economic order.

This paper originated in, and continues to emphasize, an inquiry into the rise of right-wing militarized regimes in key states throughout the Third World over the course of the last 20 years, as exemplified by the Brazilian experience since 1964. The foundations of authoritarian rule for Third World societies linked by choice to the capitalist world economic order and geopolitically to the United States embraced, also, countries that had not built up a significant modern sector comparable to what exists in Brazil. Such simpler societies, lacking a domestic industrial base, are present to different degrees in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America (especially, Central America), and Asia. Therefore, the Brazilianization trend is complemented by the phenomenon of praetorianization. This type of authoritarian state is not necessarily rightest in orientation. There are instances of both left and right praetorian regimes.

To focus on rightist developments alone ignores wider trends toward authoritarianism in left-wing Third World countries. Also relevant, if our concerns are global, is authoritarianism in the North. These wider trends suggest, although they do not demonstrate, that the authoritarian outcome is a reflection of the current world order system rather than a consequence of national ideology. More concretely, the global drift toward authoritarian patterns of governance seems to reflect the failure of the modern states system to assure the minimum realization of human rights on the national level. Such a causal hypothesis, although difficult to substantiate, as national situations are so diverse and conditioned by specific circumstances, underlies the argument that global reform of a structural character is necessary to realize an agreed set of world order values.[1]

An acceptable categorization of subtrends is difficult. The ideological distinction between socialism and capitalism seems central to dividing up what is happening in the Third World. At the same time, a distinction based on the stage of development seems crucial to acknowledge the importance of international battle lines drawn on a North-South basis. This kind of emphasis would produce a simple matrix (Table 1 below):

Table 1
Categorization of Countries

		Capitalist	Socialist
North		V	IV
South	more industrialized	I	II
	less industrialized	III	

Despite the existence of some borderline cases, every national society fits within one of these boxes. Of course, there is wide diversity within each category, and national differences arranged along some particular dimension may even outweigh the similarities of political organization and ideology.

[1]For specification of values and alternative images of global reform, see main works of World Order Models Project: Rajni Kothari, *Footsteps into the Future* (New York: Free Press, 1974); Ali Mazrui, *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective* (New York: Free Press, 1976); Horacio Godoy and Gustavo Lagos, *The Revolution in Being* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Saul H. Mendlovitz (ed.), *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990's* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Richard Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

The roman numerals in each box indicate the sequence of inquiry. Its logic is not an important element of the argument. Essentially, the most dramatic trend is that of the more industrialized Third World capitalist countries which have not only moved toward authoritarian solutions, but toward more severe variants of authoritarian rule. Such a point of departure suggests comparing the authoritarian outcomes in capitalist Third World countries on the basis of their economic and political relations with the capitalist countries in the North. It seems natural to wonder whether, and to what extent, authoritarian tendencies are being imported or domestically produced. In effect, also, it seems important to assess in what circumstances the domestic drift toward authoritarianism is being externally induced. To complete the picture it is also necessary to consider the socialist countries of the North, their corresponding linkages with socialist governments in the South, and whether their influence promotes authoritarianism.

Beyond matters of categorization and sequence lies the question of labels. What shall we call these five patterns of authoritarian tendency? Any label will be unsatisfactory to a degree, seeming either antiseptic or arbitrary. My own disposition is to accept these costs of categorization so as to highlight some key features of principal patterns. The danger of this method lies in encouraging simplistic lines of perception, lumping beneath a suggestive rubric rather distinct forms of authoritarian experience. This distinction, drawn in the Third World between Braziilianized/Leninized states that have a significant industrial sector and Praetorianized states that do not, makes some attempt at subcategorization. And yet, of course, vast differences remain among the states clustered within a single category (Table 2 below).

Table 2
Authoritarian tendencies

	Capitalist	Socialist
North	Trilateralization	Stalinization
South	Brazilianization	Leninization
	Praetorianization	

The next section of the paper outlines the general phenomenon of authoritarian tendencies in the Third World. It begins with a discussion of 'Brazilianization' as it has evolved as a model for rightist, capitalist elites in the more industrialized countries of the Third World (e.g. Iran,

Indonesia, Argentina). A common feature of these polities is to seek integration into the world trade and money markets including a receptivity to multinational corporations.

Attention will then be devoted to Leninization as manifest in virtually every Third World socialist society, regardless of whether it looks to Moscow, Peking, or itself for primary guidance. Why socialism has emerged in these Leninized forms is an agonizing question that is raised, but not herein discussed.

In addition to these forms of authoritarian rule are those that occur in conditions of relatively little industrial development. Such governance patterns can be linked with either capitalist or socialist states in the North, but are characterized more by the praetorian exercise of state power than by the ideological orientation of the regime. Praetorianization, drawing on the notion of militarized rule, can have either a left or right orientation.

A brief appraisal of authoritarianism in the socialist North will be made. Here, the central phenomenon is the persistence, despite moderating elements, of Stalinist modes of rule in the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Although Albania and Yugoslavia fall outside the Soviet orbit, and Rumania at its margin, their reliance on repressive methods and their degree of bureaucratic centralism make it tenable, at least, to include them in the broad catchment of Stalinization.

Finally, a short discussion will follow about the loss of confidence in the capacity of democratic governance to do the job in the developed countries of North America, Europe, and Japan. In this connection, it is worth noting the existence and concern of the Trilateral Commission with the viability of democracy. Among Trilateralists the central question is how to adapt capitalism to a changing global context, especially one which requires greater 'discipline' at home to achieve efficiency abroad.

After these five principal patterns have been discussed, their linkage to world order prospects will be considered. Part of the analysis here will attribute trends toward authoritarian rule, and their likely continuation, to a deteriorating world order situation, economically (capital shortage, terms of trade) and ecologically (energy costs and environmental/demographic overload), that generates militarized politics within and among states. In essence, the position of the paper is that there is no way to reverse or arrest these national trends without the emergence of a more cooperative and equitable system of world order at the global level. Perversely, these authoritarian trends militate against system-change and are, in part, a reflection of the relative strength of system-maintaining coalitions on the national level. The policy implications are obvious in one respect – the importance of linking progressive politics at the national level to global strategies for system-change – but elusive on the level of tactics. Appropriate action will

depend on the possibilities and urgencies of each national situation, including its tolerance of overt forms of antiregime behavior and of transnational movements for change.

A concern with the transnational dimension of authoritarianism has to be open to the role of nonstate actors. Multinational corporations and foreign intelligence agencies may be critical elements in the causal chain that induces and sustains authoritarian solutions in a particular society. Also significant may be international financial institutions which pressure governments to put fiscal priorities that concentrate their burden on the poor ahead of social welfare programs. The degree of impact of interventionary agents is necessarily conjectural and provokes controversy, as in the interpretation of Allende's downfall in Chile or Egypt's turn in the late 1970s toward more repressive governance.

The main states in the world have been classified according to this five-part scheme. The results are shown in Table 3. Some classifications are controversial, and new developments make such a table out of date before it is ever printed. The main purpose here is to distinguish among authoritarian patterns of rule. In addition, the geographical distribution of authoritarian regimes is shown in a composite world map (Map 1).

III. Brazilianization

This section focuses on escalating repression in the capitalist portion of the Third World beneath the rubric of Brazilianization. It examines, in particular, the socioeconomic setting of largely capitalist Third World countries in which repressive regimes emerge and stabilize themselves. This setting is being fundamentally shaped by a crisis in capital formation that pervades to varying degrees in all but a few of the resource-rich Third World countries. (For enumeration and distribution see Map 2.) The crisis is generated by a series of factors. Perhaps the most significant of these is the rigidity of class privileges and the inability of moderate political elites to maintain stability without redistributive and welfare programs to pacify the poor. If the regime is reformist, then it becomes impossible to sustain growth via reinvestment because of capital shortages, unless the country is especially endowed with resources. There is not enough capital to go around, especially given the inhibitions on taxing and expropriating the rich. In these circumstances, attempts at compromise tend to satisfy neither end of the political spectrum. As a result, discontent, instability, and economic chaos emerge, creating a context that invites a takeover by those social forces (the military and its allies) willing and able to impose 'discipline' upon the polity. This dynamic

Patterns of authoritarianism

BRAZILIANIZED	PRAETORIANIZED		LENINIZED	TRILATERALIZED	STALINIZED	PRE-AUTHORITARIAN		
	Left	Right				Left	Centrist	Right
ARGENTINA	AFGHANISTAN	BAHRAIN	ANGOLA	AUSTRALIA	ALBANIA	FINLAND	BHUTAN	BAHAMAS
BRAZIL	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BENIN	AUSTRIA	BULGARIA	TANZANIA	COLOMBIA	FRENCH GUIANA
CHILE	BANGLADESH	BURMA	CUBA	BELGIUM	CZECHOSLOVAKIA		INDIA	GAMBIA
CHINA (REP. of)	CONGO	BURUNDI	ETHIOPIA	CANADA	G.D.R.		MALDIVES	GRENADA
EGYPT	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE	GUINEA BISSAU	DENMARK	HUNGARY		MAURITANIA	ISRAEL
INDONESIA	GUINEA	COSTA RICA	GUYANA	FRANCE	POLAND		MAURITIUS	IVORY COAST
IRAN	IRAQ	DOMINICAN REP.	KAMPUCHEA (CAMBODIA)	GERMANY (FED. REP. OF)	ROMANIA		PORTUGAL	LIBERIA
KOREA (SOUTH)	LIBYA	EL SALVADOR	KOREA (NORTH)	GREECE	U.S.S.R.		SAO TOME & PRINCIPE	MALTA
MEXICO	MADAGASCAR	GABON	LAOS	ICELAND			VENEZUELA	NAURU
NIGERIA	NIGER	GHANA	MONGOLIA	IRELAND				SURINAM
PANAMA	SEYCHELLES	GUATEMALA	MOZAMBIQUE	ITALY				TRINIDAD
PERU	SIERRE LEONE	HAITI	PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA	JAPAN				ZAMBIA
PHILIPPINES	SOMALIA	HONDURAS	TIBET	LEICHTENSTEIN				
SAUDI ARABIA	SUDAN	JORDAN	VIETNAM	LUXEMBOURG				
SINGAPORE	SYRIA	KENYA	YUGOSLAVIA	NETHERLANDS				
SOUTH AFRICA	TOGO	LEBANON		NORWAY				
THAILAND	UGANDA	LESOTHO		SPAIN				
URAGUAY	P.D.R. YEMEN	MALAWI		SWEDEN				
		MALAYSIA		SWITZERLAND				
		MALI		TURKEY				
		NAMIBIA		UNITED KINGDOM				
		NEPAL		UNITED STATES OF AMERICA				
		NICARAGUA						
		OMAN						
		PARAGUAY						
		RHODESIA						
		RWANDA						
		SENEGAL						
		SWAZILAND						
		TUNESIA						
		UNITED ARAB EMIRATES						

12

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 1

Categories of authoritarian rule

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 2

Brazilianized countries

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

is generally played out against an ideological backdrop in which geopolitical themes, ideological images, and interventionary pressures are manipulated by the participants.

The pattern of right-wing repressive governance is exhibited in forms corresponding to the exceedingly diverse situations of Third World countries. These variations reflect differences in size, level of economic development, resource endowment, political culture, geopolitical salience. Nevertheless, despite these diversities – in fact, all the more remarkable because of them – there is an emergent form of militarized repression that shares sufficient features to justify being perceived as a pattern, although two qualifications are in order. First, the political character of each national situation is dynamic. Brazil itself continuously evolves as the governing elite shifts its leadership, seeks to accommodate cross-pressures, and experiments with various tactics. Hence, 'Brazilianization' refers to the essence of the Brazilian experience since 1964, without purporting to be descriptive through time. The essential point remains, however, that those political elites that align themselves with capitalist forces, internal and external to their country, and seek to augment the bureaucratic apparatus of state power are responding to the same set of pressures exemplified by the Brazilian case. However, if there is no modern sector in the economy, then the Brazilian case seems inapplicable. These premodern trends toward authoritarian rule will be dealt with in the next section under the label of Praetorianism. Here we set forth some of the features of Brazilianization.

1. Militarized governance

The apparatus of the state is controlled directly or indirectly by the military establishment; military officers are the key leaders and civilian institutions are subordinated, if not altogether eliminated. Typically, control of the state by the military is initially attained by extra-constitutional means, usually by a *coup d'etat*. The coup is not, however, intended merely to obtain political leadership for a given faction within the elite; it represents a long-term commitment, more or less permanent, to restructure state power in an authoritarian direction, even though such restructuring may pass through a number of tactical phases of severity and moderation.

2. Rightist ideology

Although militarized governing systems can be leftist in orientation (e.g. Libya, Ethiopia, Uganda), most are anti-leftist, which, in contemporary

terms, means anti-Marxist in rhetoric and policy, as well as linked externally to the United States, Western Europe, or Japan. This orientation is especially true for the Brazilianized category as Third World countries with a modern sector linked to the capitalist world economic order necessarily profess a rightist ideology. These rightist military and quasi-military regimes identify their countries' social-political futures with the security and prosperity of the urban upper classes working in collaboration with technocrats active in the state bureaucracy. Rightist leaders view the popular sector, or the masses, and sometimes the traditional rural elites, as potential or actual hostile social forces that must be demobilized and controlled. Internationally, such regimes are anti-Soviet, anti-communist in outlook, and look to the United States and/or its principal allies for diplomatic and economic support, as well as for arms.

3. Capitalist development strategy

The main rationalization of rightist militarization involves overcoming the obstacles to rapid national economic development when a capitalist approach is adopted, which increasingly includes relying on heavy public sector involvement. It should be understood that the capitalist impulse in the Brazilianization context tends to adopt a fascist rather than a liberal course and is influenced by neocolonialist situations of dependency. Hence, state capitalism and transnational financial influence play a strong role. The state spawns a bureaucracy with its own interests in expanding the role of the state even in competition with elements of the national bourgeoisie. Similarly, the bureaucratic managers may be inclined to favor external capitalists, for reasons of either technocratic efficiency or personal corruption, at the expense of internal capitalists. As well, the regime is often closely aligned in a dependency relationship with powerful governments in the North which exert a real influence over policy choices, sometimes even playing operational roles through a CIA-type covert presence.

The original pretext for the military takeover is normally associated with the inability of civilian leadership to maintain order sufficient to check inflation, labor unrest, political turmoil. These societal conditions allegedly destroy investor confidence and make it difficult to attract capital from abroad in the form of private investment, bank loans, or international economic assistance. The military leadership initially declares its mission as saving the country from the chaos brought on by radical and destabilizing demands for greater 'equity' and/or from corrupt or indecisive civilian-led governing arrangements. Such a role for the new military leadership presupposes the capacity and willingness of government to discipline the poor

so that they will accept low wages or acquiesce in high regional and sectoral unemployment without disrupting productive processes via strikes, demonstrations, and oppositional politics. The economic goal of militarization in a dependent capitalist context is a high rate of growth in gross national product, regardless of distributive consequences at least for the near term.[2] The poor (and sometimes, as well, portions of the national bourgeoisie) are 'squeezed' to assure revenues and stability that benefit the state bureaucracy and most, or at least some, of the traditionally privileged classes. Rightist militarization may be associated with dramatic results, at least for a time and depending on the international economic situation, with respect to economic growth; for example, Brazil had a growth rate of 9·3% between 1970 and 1975. These successful years were hailed as 'the Brazilian miracle' and were viewed, for a time, as a model for governance that vindicated the functional dependence of rapid growth of GNP upon authoritarian methods of rule.

Militarization along these lines typically occurs because of a perceived crisis in capital formation.[3] Civilian leaders generally seek to steer a middle course between appeasing the poor and satisfying the rich, generating frustrations on both sides that may erupt into political violence. Moderate civilian governments in the Third World generally lack the capability to reorient the economy to favor the popular sector, as bourgeois and statist elements in the government will resist such a mandate and are likely to be reinforced in their resistance by the dominant sectors of global capitalism as embodied in the rich countries of the North and reinforced by their international economic mechanisms for organizing the world economy (GATT, IMF, OECD). As a result, constitutionally-based civilian leadership has appeared to lack the capacity to achieve either *the efficiency* of military governance or *the equity* and *participation* of left authoritarian regimes.

In this context, deepening polarization of the left and right occurs, with the balance of forces within the military being normally, and intuitively, aligned with the right (although not invariably) and capable of tipping the domestic balance by seizing control of the state.

---

[2]See, for example, Albert Fishlow, 'Some Reflections on Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy', and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The "Portugalization" of Brazil' in: Alfred Stepan (ed.), *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 69-118, 179-232.

[3]See, especially, the penetrating assessment along these lines in: Guillermo A. O'Donnell, 'Corporatism and the Question of the State', in James M. Malloy (ed.), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 47-88.

4. Militarist 'new politics'

The leadership of Third World military establishments has been overwhelmingly trained in the North, principally the United States, for several decades to regard their principal role as one of 'internal security', guarding the polity against leftist radical forces ready and eager to subvert the state. Such a role contrasts with the traditional domestic function of the military to act as arbiter among contending civilian forces or as temporary custodian of state power while civilian struggles for dominance are resolved. This new role for the military involves accepting a more permanent mandate to safeguard the polity and manage the modernization process. The United States, as part of its response in the 1950s, and even more energetically in the early 1960s, to the communist endorsement of 'wars of national liberation', was instrumental through its aid and training programs in orienting critical elements in many Third World military establishments to adopt a counterinsurgency outlook toward their own populations. This 'new professionalism' of Third World military elites helps 'legitimize' seizure of power – at least within the military establishment itself.[4]

5. Ascendant military establishment

As might be expected, militarization along these lines tends to increase defense spending and to diminish budgets for social welfare purposes.[5] By giving the military what it wants for defense expenditure, the governing elite mutes factional disputes within the military and seeks to hold succession politics within reasonable bounds.[6] Perhaps most fundamentally, this model of militarized control produces strong state structures domestically and strengthens the capacity of a given state to participate in the world system. Statist aspirations for an enhanced status are usually associated with a dynamic military establishment. Hence, the military sector in this kind of polity is often the most dynamic, the most technologically modern, the most rapidly growing, as well as the inspirational source of

[4]See Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). For a more general, carefully nuanced assessment, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'Armies and Politics in Latin America', *World Politics XXVII*, 107–130, 1974.

[5]Empirical confirmation in Schmitter (f.n. 2).

[6]See Fernando Pedreira, 'Decompression in Brazil?', *Foreign Affairs 53*, 498-512, 1975.

continuing ideological leadership for the polity.[7]

The priority attached to a national military buildup may feed regional arms races. These are aided and abetted by the sales policies of the developed world, especially the United States. The motivations of suppliers may include the desire to earn foreign exchange with which to offset or diminish balance-of-payments deficits. The magnitude of North–South arms flows may thus reflect structural features of the world economy additional to geopolitical considerations. The quantity and quality of arms sent in recent years to Iran certainly is influenced by such economic factors.[8] Arms sales have been increasing at a dramatic rate during the course of Third World militarization, and have especially climbed following rising oil import costs. Tables 4 and 5 show US military assistance and US arms sales to the world and clearly reflect the strategic and economic interests of the US during a given period of time. The figures for 1970 and 1975 and the percentage change between those two years show that Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, all areas in which militarization and repression are on the rise, have received substantially increased amounts of US military aid while the developed world has received no military assistance. A similar pattern is discernible for arms sales. Arms sales from the US to all parts of the world have increased between 1970 and 1975. But the most significant increase occurred in sales to Africa, and sales to South Asia and the Middle East followed closely behind. These trends may not continue indefinitely as thresholds of saturation may have been crossed. Also, import of ultrasophisticated weaponry builds dependency links that may conflict with nationalistic goals.

The ascendency of the military may also produce internal strains in time. Portions of the military sector are very nationalistic; they resent the acceptance of external control and seek to achieve more genuine autonomy for their country. The strains may show in attitudes toward MNCs, international financial institutions, and even some colonial issues. Brazil, for instance, welcomed the independence of Portugal's African colonies despite their left orientation. A more telling instance of tension, although one limited in relevance to major countries, is the aspiration to become a strong world power, exemplified by the quest for nuclear weaponry. Nowhere is there a clearer indication of the conflicting pulls of economic dependence and geopolitical ambition. To Third World leaders, the whole web of policies

---

[7]See discussion to this effect in Carlos Estevan Martins, 'Brazil and the United States from the 1960's to the 1970's', in Julio Cotter and Richard R. Fagen (eds.), *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 269–301, especially 298–301.

[8]For an analysis along these lines, see Leslie M. Pryor, 'Arms and the Shah', *Foreign Policy 31*, 56–71, 1978.

*Table 4**
US Military assistance for years 1966, 1970, 1975 by regions
(Millions of current dollars)

Regions	1966	1970	% change	1975	% change
Developing:					
Region 2 (Europe)†	281·3	295·0	+ 4·8	198·1	— 32·8
Region 3 (Latin America)	131·4	26·4	— 79·9	156·8	+ 493·9
Region 4 (Far East)	1179·3	2492·8	+ 111·3	1243·2	— 50·1
Region 5 (So. Asia)	9·0	0·5	— 94·9	0·6	+ 20·0
Region 6 (Middle East)	251·1	3·7	— 98·5	104·7	+2729·0
Region 7 (Africa)	36·1	19·4	— 46·2	70·5	+ 263·4
Developed:‡					
Region 1 (Canada)					
Region 2 (Europe)	49·2	0·0	— 100·0	0·0	0
Region 4 (Japan)	1·7	0·0	— 100·0	0·0	0
Region 6 (Israel)	90·0	30·0	— 66·6	300·0	+ 900·0
Region 8 (Oceania)	5·0	0·0	— 100·0	0·0	0

*Computed from figures contained in *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations*, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1975 (Washington: U.S. AID, 1976).

†'Developing' European countries: Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Albania, Malta, Spain, Yugoslavia.

‡Developed countries: Canada, Japan, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, USSR, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland.

*Table 5***
US Arms sales for years 1966, 1970, 1975, by regions
(Millions of current dollars)

Regions	1966	1970	% change	1975	% change
Developing:					
Region 2 (Europe)	24·277	58·719	+ 141·8	322·933	+ 449·9
Region 3 (Latin America)	24·6	25·0	— 1·6	154·7	+ 518·8
Region 4 (Far East)	5·8	61·3	+ 956·8	439·0	+ 616·1
Region 5 (So. Asia)	10·2	51·4	+ 403·9	1419·2	+2661·0
Region 6 (Middle East)	209·6	143·2	— 31·6	2970·5	+1974·3
Region 7 (Africa)	7·8	7·8	0	330·0	+4130·7
Developed:					
Region 1 (Canada)	70·2	53·1	— 24·3	102·1	+ 92·0
Region 2 (Europe)	1126·423	387·281	— 65·6	2680·767	+ 592·2
Region 4 (Japan)	16·6	21·2	+ 27·7	29·6	+ 39·6
Region 6 (Israel)	72·1	44·9	— 37·7	868·7	+1834·7
Region 8 (Oceania)	52·5	59·4	+ 13·1	162·7	+ 173·9

**Computed from data in *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, November 1975.

embodied in the nonproliferation policies of the North is viewed with a mixture of suspicion and hostility.

6. Repressive policies and apparatus

To assure the success of militarized governance under modern conditions requires the absence of political opposition. Given the reality of right/left splits in Third World politics, ascendancy to power by either the right or the left means intense opposition by the other. Harsh means are relied upon to quell opposition. To resist under such conditions requires desperate strategies, kidnappings, terrorism, armed struggle. A vicious circle of repression and resistance ensues. To discipline the polity successfully appears to require reliance on torture and official terror as staple ingredients of rule. An internal security bureaucracy, that includes a network of spies and informers to penetrate all parts of society, and often to reach overseas to control exile activity, emerges and grows. As with other aspects of right-wing militarization, the internal security system is developed in a modern spirit with outside (usually American) support and guidance.[9] Although militarized regimes vary considerably in their tolerance of political and cultural activity, all of them insist upon 'emergency' prerogatives to remove undesirables from the scene and to impose policies designed to intimidate the population from any kind of massive protest.[10]

As the surge of oppositional activity in Iran during 1978 illustrated, modernizing forms of repressive rule may foster a wide-ranging coalition in which socially conservative groups (including those of a religious character) may unite with secular, liberalizing constitutionalists and even with radical, Marxist elements. It is not only the severity of repression and the persistence of an objectionable regime, but it is also its tendency to do cultural violence in the name of progress and modernity. Such a reality is especially true in a traditionalist society such as Iran where the hold of religion is strong and

---

[9]For example, see 'United States Policies and Programs in Brazil', Hearings of Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 4, 5 and 11, 1971; Michael Klare and Nancy Stein, 'Exporting the Tools of Repression', Reprint No. 104, Center for National Security Studies, December 1976, pp. 1–15; Walden Bellow and Severina Rivera (eds.), *The Logistics of Repression*, (Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977).

[10]Norman Gall illustrates this characteristic by reference to the callous disregard of human welfare in relation to train safety and service between outlying workers' communities and Rio de Janeiro. See Gall, 'The Rise of Brazil', *Commentary, 63*, 45-55, on p. 50, 1977.

where a regime loses, rather than achieves legitimacy, by westernizing, modernizing. In other words, the antitraditionalist character of a high-technology approach to development deeply alienates certain social forces that are normally dormant and even reactionary and may transform them in certain progressive directions (e g .o insist upon human rights).

7. Coalition with technocrats

The 'legitimacy' of a military takeover will generally depend on its economic performance, its capacity to provide the discipline and skill needed to increase economic and political power of the state by means of steady GNP growth, especially in the urban industrial sector. In order to assure the realization of these goals, the state must play a significant role, even overriding to a considerable extent market forces. The military will not simply protect the traditional sectors of economic privilege from the social forces whose grievances lead to pressure from below; its main objective is to stimulate, sustain, and even direct economic growth by a sophisticated mixture of fiscal and regulatory policies that make the state an important and direct participant in the economy. These tendencies toward administered capitalism antedate the assumption of direct political control by the military (for instance, in Brazil they were evident throughout the 1946–1964 period). However, with the military in power, the process accelerates dramatically. Technocrats as expert administrators are essential elements in such an economic strategy. These civil servants share with their military colleagues impatience over the 'inefficiencies' of the conventional politicians who are distracted from true priorities by their search for popularity, their deference to tradition, and their tendency to support sentimental economic priorities. In the push toward modernity, the military reinforce the framework, and the technocrats supply the planning and oversight. Without the technocrats, the generals would often face mounting opposition. Furthermore, they would be unable to provide society with the kind of efficient and economically successful leadership that could stabilize their rule and, in time, give it a measure of legitimacy.

8. Public enterprise and investment

As suggested, the state enters the economy as principal investor in key industries as well as presides as manager. It should be understood in the Brazilian instance that Vargas established and evolved the corporatist structure in the 1930s, and that the post–1964 developments amount to

adaptations and intensifications of these earlier structures.[11] This is an important Brazilian circumstance that is not present to the same degree in other Third World countries, with a modern economic sector and an authoritarian political system.

The growth-oriented ideology encourages corporatist procedures, with the state constantly expanding its economic role.[12] Many basic industries like energy production and distribution, communications, and transportation are state-owned in this special form of militarization in a Third World capitalist context. The move to the right makes no attempt to establish a liberal economic order based on *laissez-faire* market conceptions, nor to supplement market dynamics merely by introducing Keynesian 'fixes' intended to maintain 'full employment' at times when investment levels fall. The new focus is upon efficiency and growth of the economic aggregate, and the leaders accept high levels of unemployment and large-scale poverty for the indefinite future as unavoidable side effects of according priority to economic viability.

As well, management of external economic relations is often a technical matter with fundamental societal consequences. Attitudes toward external indebtedness and balance-of-payments deficits are directly related to the inflow of capital to a given Third World country. In recent years, the level of indebtedness, need for short-term capital credits from international markets, and payment imbalances have intensified still further the role of technocrats and have transformed militarized regimes of this sort in a corporatist, state capitalist direction.

9. Geopolitical links

Often, but not invariably, militarized regimes of the kind I have been describing come into being with the blessing, if not the active help, of the United States government. The precise relationship is difficult to demonstrate in most situations, although recent revelations and investigations disclose a pattern of widespread CIA support for the transition to militarized rule and its subsequent stabilization.[13] Even when links can be demonstrated to

[11] For detailed elaboration of this pre-1964 corporatist background in Brazil, see Kenneth Paul Erikson, *The Brazilian Corporatist State and Working-Class Politics*, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 11–46.

[12] For elaboration, see essays in Malloy (f.n. 3).

[13] See, for example, Robert L. Borosage and John Marks (eds.), *The CIA File* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976); 'Covert Action: Intelligence Activities', Hearings, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., December 4–5, 1975.

exist, their causal significance is difficult to assess. How important are pre-coup assurances of post-coup American diplomatic and material support? How important are different forms of advice and help at various stages of a struggle for power in a foreign society? A militarized rightist government tends to attract capital and political support both from the market economies in the industrialized world and from international lending institutions dominated by OECD perspectives. This support will not generally be reduced despite evidence of severe abuses of human rights. The Carter Administration avidly embraced a human rights diplomacy in its early months; in practice, however, it has not increased pressure on repressive regimes. Indeed, the evidence mounts that in such flagrant instances of repression as in Argentina and Nicaragua the United States has done its best to give the regime support.[14]

If severe abuse of human rights coincides with geopolitical antagonism, such as Amin in Uganda, then it engenders genuine opposition. Liberal sentiment reinforces assessments of material interests. And if the leader should be an anti-Western black or Arab (e.g. Qaddafi), then a racist underpinning strengthens the self-righteous demands of the West for liberalization. Regimes with equally objectionable human rights records, if important to the American-led global alliance, are entrusted with increasing regional roles as anti-radical 'enforcers'.[15] More characteristically, the American-led Western global alliance views the principal examples of such regimes – Brazil, Iran, Indonesia – as 'junior partners' in the alliance against radicalism. During the 1970s, Iran's intervention in Oman to defeat the Dhofar uprising, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, and Brazil's support for counter-insurgency throughout the Southern Cone illustrate these regional 'peace-keeping' roles. In addition, these regimes also provide the West, especially the United States, with relatively safe havens for military bases and space stations, as well as a comparatively secure and profitable setting for overseas capital and market development, including operations of multinational corporations.

[14]For America's role in sustaining the Samoza regime in Nicaragua even while it is in the midst of defending itself against a broad-based opposition, see Penny Lernoux, 'Nicaragua's Civil War', *The Nation*, 16 September, 1978, pp. 230–231; also see the related piece,. Jim Morrell, 'Behind the Scenes at the IMF', *The Nation*, 16 September, 1978, pp. 232–235.

[15]Example: 'But if Iran is called upon to intervene in the internal affairs of any Gulf state, it must be recognized in advance by the United States that this is the role for which Iran is being primed and blame cannot be assigned for Iran's carrying out of an implied assignment' – from 'Access to Oil – The United States Relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran', 16 September, 1978 Senate Committee of Energy and Natural Resources, December 1977, p. 84.

10. Statism

Partially contrary to (9), the militarized governance pattern, once relatively secure in power, may impinge on investor interests as it moves strongly to realize its own statist and nationalist commitments. Its logic is to establish control and policies of its own, rather than to defer to an outside patron or 'senior partner'. In this respect, some militarized regimes, despite their internal reactionary policies, have actually joined in the front ranks of the struggle for a new international economic order. Part of this independent posture in international arena appears to stem from a quest for international legitimacy on the part of governmental leadership. Experience in Brazil, India, Thailand, South Korea, and elsewhere suggests that these militarized regimes cannot count upon institutionalizing their legitimacy via the popular endorsement of official policies in elections even if they build up a record of economic successes. Unless rigged, the consistent result of 'opening' the system to electoral politics, even of a restricted kind, has been the repudiation of the economic, political, and ideological approach of these militarized regimes. More recently, the principal governments that fall in the category of militarized regimes have refused to forfeit their nuclear options or to accept American leadership in the area of nonproliferation policy. Brazil also, for instance, has been steadily diversifying its trade and investment patterns and has refused to define its diplomatic stance in the United Nations by following the American lead (e.g. Brazil voted for the anti-Zionist resolution in the General Assembly in 1975). Even on an economic plane, the drive for statist internal control has led these regimes to impose an increasing web of regulatory authority around foreign investment. On another level, the growing burden of foreign indebtedness built up to $160 billion by the end of 1976 reflects, not only the extent to which these militarized politics attract outside capital, but also their degree of vulnerability. After a certain point has been reached, a government, like any large-scale debtor, must either accept external interference in its economy to sustain its credit standing or suffer the loss of credit which might provoke a domestic economic crisis.

By describing the nature of rightist militarization in a capitalist context, I am not implying uniformity or conspiracy. I do argue that certain underlying circumstances in the Third World have generated a pattern of response in which some shared characteristics are present, although these trends are reinforced by principal imperial actors and by their close association with multinational corporations, the main bearers or agents of international capitalism in the present era. There is a time dynamic that is destabilizing the militarized regimes established in the 1960s and 1970s. To the extent that these regimes do not succeed in realizing their claims to produce faster growth, control inflation, and stimulate investment, one major rationale for

their oppressive existence is removed. If, in addition, the left has been destroyed or neutralized, then other main rationale for oppression is undercut. As a consequence, discontent will deepen and spread, and new forms of mass opposition can be expected to surface early in the 1980s.[16]

The image of 'falling dominoes' depicted in the global trend toward militarized governance is not meant to imply that events in Brazil have had a causal impact elsewhere, except possibly to a slight extent among Southern Cone countries. Even in the Cone, domestic circumstances, abetted by international factors, have principally produced outcomes in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay that resemble the Brazilian solution in key respects. Also, there is a demonstration effect, difficult to calculate, that leads rightist policy-makers and political figures to regard the Brazilian experience as 'a positive model' for their own societal situation. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his celebrated attack on Third World approaches to development that were infatuated with distributional priorities (which he attributed ludicrously to the Fabianism of the London School of Economics), pointed to Brazil as a healthy contrast, given its high rates of GNP growth and its emphasis on expanding the productive base of the modern sector. All those concerned with 'order' as a precondition for modernization within the capitalist frame have been impressed by the degree to which counterinsurgency methods in Brazil eliminated radical politics from the scene. Note that the Brazilian case illustrated both the need to impose 'discipline' on dissatisfaction, especially among workers, as well as the need to create 'stability' by dealing with those who would overthrow the regime by violent means if they could. That is, not only radical but reformist behavior must be suppressed; hence, a moderate government won't do; only an extremist one will suppress to that degree. In South Korea, this pattern of extended repression is especially clear, as the targets are often prominent religious or cultural figures boasting strong anti-communist, anti-North Korea credentials (e.g. Hon Suk Han). They pose a menace because they question the fairness of the economic arrangements – especially, squeezing the poor – and object to official claims that the denial of civil liberties is necessary for the sake of national security.

They also pose a menace because Brazilianization introduces a slick West-evolved 'international culture', symbolized by Coca-Cola, IBM, and Hilton Hotels. This cultural dimension – a spontaneous commitment to neocolonial national identity – offends deeply religious and traditional social forces and values. The anti-Shah uprisings in Iran during 1978 erupted out of this core reality of defending the indigenous culture against the disruptions of accelerated modernization.

[16] A persuasive refutation of the functional case for authoritarian governance is made by Jose Serra, 'Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes', October 1978, mimeo.

Brazilianization is a repetition of the experience in Brazil in other Third World countries. The common domestic elements are the impulse to stabilize and modernize the economy and the polity without displacing privileged classes to any substantial degree and, above all, without embracing Marxist approaches. Put differently, how to modernize to achieve GNP growth without abandoning capitalism on an international level or squeezing the rich too hard as a domestic source of capital? Part of the challenge is to concentrate capital resources in an effective, sustained way. Here, tax reform is part of the answer; external credit from foreign banks and international lending institutions is important as well; conditions of profitability for the MNC, and for large-scale domestic enterprise (private and state) is a still further element in the overall picture, as is, seemingly inevitably, large-scale corruption among the ruling elite. To pursue such a course, the popular sector must be demobilized to the extent possible and dealt with harshly to the extent necessary.

The drift of Sadat's government in Egypt during the early months of 1977 is suggestive. To gain external credit under IMF auspices, pressures mounted to allow the market to set food prices, but such austere policies that are fiscally sound resulted in squeezing the poor beyond their levels of tolerance. Hence, food riots leading the regime either to give way, jeopardizing capital prospects, or to impose 'discipline', jeopardizing moderate forms of governance. Sadat has chosen the latter course, temporarily at least. His entire economic policy was based on making Egypt attractive to investors and lenders.

India's 1975 move toward 'discipline' is also illustrative of the pressure in a major Third World country to couple economic stabilization with repression. It is indicative also of the unpopularity of such a strategy, despite the appearance of some temporary achievements by way of efficiency, elimination of corruption and favoritism, and through the creation of a better business atmosphere. By calling for elections in 1977 Indira Gandhi displaced her credentials as 'a pale criminal', unable or unwilling to close off the electoral channels of discontent so as to proceed with the tactics of Brazilianization. (Whoever claimed that Brazilianization was popular? The oft-quoted comment by the Director of the Central Bank of Chile in the Pinochet years is indicative – 'The fact that 90% of the people were against us proves that our economic plan is working.') It is a misunderstanding of this form of militarized governance to suppose that it can engender a popular mandate, especially to the extent that it bases its relations to the masses on the goal of demobilization.[17] Even with good harvest years helped by favorable monsoon

[17] See Stepan (f.n. 2), especially Juan Linz, 'The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil', pp. 233–254.

rains, the electoral rebuff of 'the emergency' style of Madame Gandhi's rule was startling, especially given the extent to which press criticism was stifled and opposition leaders jailed or isolated. However, the restoration of democratic forms does not assure the survival of moderate politics in India. Indeed, the structural crisis that made 'the emergency' an attractive option in 1975 has not been resolved, and there is no prospect for the sort of socialist reforms that are needed if India is to redirect its productive and distributive resources toward the alleviation of poverty and the realization of the basic needs of its population as a whole. Indeed, the post–Gandhi governing coalition is even less inclined than its predecessor to attempt fundamental reforms in either land tenure arrangements or indigenous business entrepreneurship. As a consequence, it seems likely that the Desai government is a moderate interlude between authoritarian patterns of governance in India. We have no real understanding of how the current leadership would respond to militant demands that result in inflation, disorder, and a sense of anxiety among 'the force of order' in India's powerful military establishment and, more generally, among its conservative–traditionalist elites.

IV. Leninization

A second major form of militarized governance structure emerges in the Third World as part of the reaction against capitalism. Indeed, socialist ideology proposes as its *raison d'etre* the liberation of suffering humanity from the yoke of capitalist exploitation and the establishment of a socialist state. The rubric 'Leninization' is not entirely satisfactory; it is used to differentiate the underlying drift toward authoritarian rule in Third World societies that are ruled by Marxist–Leninist elites from the pathological expression of state socialism that reached its peak in the Soviet Union under Stalin, and lives on there in diluted form (See Map 3).

The historical success of the socialist movement has reflected the wedding of a Marxist critique with a Leninist strategy for seizing and holding power. The critical contribution of Leninism has been its clear–headed realization that armed struggle and the buildup of a strong socialist state are necessary preconditions for sustainable system–change on the national level. The capitalist elite, with its dominance over the civil and military apparatus of state power, is never displaced by the outcome reached in electoral politics, nor will, to the extent possible, imperialist centers of power allow the spread of socialist governance structure. The failure of the Allende government of Chile in 1970–1973 to protect itself against bureaucratic harassment, internal class enemies, and external intervention reinforces the Leninist position

on the national level. The intervention of the United States to assure Allende's failure and downfall illustrates the international side of the Leninist position.

Socialism has been sustained on a national scale only where it has been preceded by armed struggle (including the occupation of a country by the Soviet army). The darker side of the Leninist success story is that it has resulted in socialist seizures of undisputed power. The explanation for this experience in socialist countries is controversial and obscure. One explanation is to blame the arrogance of power implicit in Marxist–Leninist thinking, especially the conviction that after the revolution the state apparatus is reconstituted as 'a dictatorship', with no political space allowed for oppositional tendencies and no attention given to avoiding abuses of power by the new bureaucratic elite. A second explanation is to argue that hostile social forces, internal and external to a given country, generate a genuine counter-revolutionary interventionary danger that can be resisted only by mobilizing the full panoply of state power, that the danger persists, and that bureaucratic inertia of various sorts makes it difficult under such circumstances to liberalize once the danger has passed. A third line of explanation is that conditions of underdevelopment and poverty make it essential for any efficient governing structure, whether socialist or capitalist, to impose a high degree of discipline on the general population during the period of accelerating capital accumulation and industrial growth. A fourth explanation stresses the materialist failure of socialism to satisfy mass expectations or to create a genuine socialist ethos to take the place of the capitalist ethos which preceded it. That is, socialist conceptions of social and political organization remain unpopular, or become unpopular, with a substantial segment of the population, making it necessary to impose authority by force rather than consent. A final explanation suggests that Third World communist party movements have been shaped and influenced by a Stalinized Soviet Union. Of course, in a given country, the political reality is likely to reflect some combination of these elements.

Underneath these explanations rages a vital controversy as to whether it is plausible to envision genuinely socialist states in the Third World that are viable and yet do not move toward some form of repressive rule. Of course, the issue is one of degree, and it is misleading in the extreme to refuse to draw a distinction between the Soviet Union under Stalin, with millions of political prisoners, and under Brezhnev, with only a few thousand, or between the degree of repression present in China, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Some Third World countries have embarked on various sorts of experiments with decentralization in economic, social, and political life. Despite these positive features, it remains correct that each of the socialist states has preempted most of the legitimate political, moral, and cultural space within its polity, that it has displayed virtually no toleration

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 3
Leninized countries

for even those adversaries who share socialist commitments, that it has failed to encourage popular creativity, and that it has dealt harshly and arbitrarily with its perceived opponents. Such a characterization seems applicable even to a governing process that has achieved historic results in other realms of state activity, as in the case, especially, of Cuba, Vietnam, and China.

There is a temptation to symmetrize the phenomena of Brazilianization and Leninization.[18] It is a dangerous temptation, because it tends to overlook the socialist advantage arising from its promises about, and achievements of, equality, solidarity, and liberation. Socialism, in some form, seems like the only possible way to meet the human needs of Third World peoples in the face of the interplay between demographic and ecological pressures. And, indeed, the distributional record of socialist countries is far superior to its capitalist equivalents, although it is difficult to obtain data suitable for comparison.[19] Furthermore, since socialist governance does not entail exploitation in principle, it would seem less dependent on a coercive state to sustain itself in power. Finally, there are many socialist political groupings in the Third World that have grown sensitive to the need for restraint of socialist state power, and seek to rule within a strict constitutional framework of accountability and competitive politics. Should these socialist elites achieve and sustain power, until displaced by constitutional procedures (disproving the Leninist contentions), and should they achieve nonrepressive modes of socialist governance, then a powerful normative model for a Third World socialist state would exist. Precisely because of this prospect, I would expect strenuous efforts by Trilateralist and Stalinist centers of power, possibly in concert, to prevent these outcomes in the Third World, just as they appear to cooperate to avoid such political developments in Western Europe.

Having clarified the extent to which socialism is more promising than capitalism as a political solution at the national level, it is necessary to reassert the main thesis. Which is that the decline in moderate possibilities deepens the left/right split, and to the extent the left has succeeded it has brought with it, especially in the Third World, various adaptations of Leninist forms of socialist rule. Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique as well as the three countries of Indochina illustrate this pattern and thus contribute to the basic trend toward authoritarian rule in the Third World.

---

[18]Peter L. Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change* (New York: Basic Books), 1974.

[19]For background, see Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in Communist and Capitalist Societies* (New York, 1971); David Lance, *The End of Inequality? Stratification Under State Socialism* (Baltimore, Md., 1971); see also contribution of Jorge Dominguez to Council on Foreign Relations volume from the 1980s project on human rights, forthcoming, 1979, for systematic attempt at comparison.

V. A note on Iran's Islamic Republic

A new form of governing structure is taking shape in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. Iran's emergent Islamic Republic promises democratic governance with a core commitment to social justice on behalf of the poor. If it fulfills these aspirations, it will establish a nonauthoritarian progressive model of humane governance. These positive prospects are clouded by a variety of disquieting signs: harshness in the application of Islamic law, reliance on secret trial procedures and executions to deal with those who committed crimes against the Iranian people on behalf of the Shah's regime, and intolerance toward political and cultural dissent that deviates from Shi'ia canons of propriety. Only the future can tell whether the Islamic Republic is a new species of authoritarianism or not.

VI. Praetorianism[20]

In addition to Brazilianization and Leninization, there is a set of tendencies toward authoritarian rule that is not directly connected with 'late, late capitalist development'. In these national situations, autocratic rule is a reflection of 'political underdevelopment', that is, a lack of procedures and institutions capable of legitimating governmental authority in a sustainable manner without reliance on force. In such a society, arbitrary force at the disposal of the rulers is the basic political premise, and the military or paramilitary security system is needed to secure the compliance of the population. The extent of Praetorianism as of 1978 is suggested by Maps 4, 5 and 6.

The societal structure may be closely linked in a dependent way to outside economic forces, as has been the case in Central American and African countries that fall into this category. The dictator or maximal leader provides order and seeks to work out acceptable arrangements with external capitalist and geopolitical forces. Given the complexity of the world scene, such an autocratic regime may make differing alignments for distinct concerns, joining with East or West on strategic questions, insisting as a member of the

[20]The most fundamental consideration of praetorianism as a form of authoritarian rule is Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 192-263. For refinement and extension of Huntington approach, see Henry Bienen, 'Military and Society in East Africa: Thinking Again about Praetorianism', in Henry Bienen (ed.), *Armies and Parties in Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 165–186.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 4

Praetorianized countries : general

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 5

Praetorianized countries : left

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 6

Praetorianized countries : right

South on global economic reform, and linking to the capitalist North when it comes to national developmental strategy.

In African settings, this kind of autocratic rule may have either a left or a right ideology. In some instances, as with Uganda, the diplomatic and ideological stance may be left but the economic linkages may still be primarily associated with capitalist actors and markets.

The point about praetorian rule is that it involves the seizure and exercise of state power by an elite that does not rest its legitimacy on any system of political accountability to the citizenry. Furthermore, recourse to autocratic rule is not a consequence of a central economic crisis arising out of the need to deepen capitalist development or to discipline labor demands for economic shares and rights of participation. There is some overlap. In the praetorianized instances, autocratic leadership may seek to vindicate its authority externally by a claim to provide sufficient order to assure profitable investment and steady economic growth.

Unlike the Brazilianized society, there is little opportunity for experiments in liberalization. There is in these societies only a small middle class. There is virtually no tradition of moderate political participation. Politics are polarized. Opposition to the government almost necessarily assumes the form of armed struggle.

VII. Some Generalizations about Authoritarian Rule in the Third World

The present extent of authoritarianism in the Third World can now be considered. Here we attempt to make the basic case for a spread of repressive rule in a series of world maps (Maps 7 to 12) beginning in 1960. On these maps we indicate those Third World countries subject to repressive rule in each five-year interval since 1960.

We distinguish degrees of repressiveness in each of the first five maps (Maps 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). The authoritarian pattern is far broader than the militarization of political rule, its insulation from civilian accountability. Nevertheless, the degree of such insulation gives some sense of the degree of repressiveness. Hence, we identify those states ruled by military officers, those in which martial law or state of emergency has been declared by the government, and, finally, those in which civilians rule the country but disallow a political opposition to function normally and depend heavily on the military to keep them in power.

On the sixth map (Map 12) we identify left and right orientations of the repressive governments. We make this ideological classification on the basis of three criteria: attitudes toward multinationals, patterns of global alignment, and socialization of the economy. In some instances – for instance, Algeria

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 7

Third World authoritarian regimes : 1960

Map 8

Third World authoritarian regimes : 1965



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 9

Third World authoritarian regimes : 1970


1970
Militarized Government
Government under martial law, state of emergency, or otherwise quasi-military
Civilian/Monarch leadership heavily influenced by military

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 10

Third World authoritarian regimes : 1975


1975
Militarized Government
Government under martial law, state of emergency, or otherwise quasi-military
Civilian/Monarch leadership heavily influenced by military

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 11

Third World authoritarian regimes : 1979

1979
Militarized Government
Government under martial law, state of emergency, or otherwise quasi-military
Civilian/Monarch leadership heavily influenced by military.

Map 12

Authoritarian regimes by political orientation



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

or India - the ideological profile is a confused one, and recourse is had to a 'mixed' category. Our attempt is to make such a distinction as reasonably as possible for the most recent year in the fifteen-year period examined.

These maps, even if one objects to a particular decision as to classification, reveal clearly a trend toward rightist forms of militarization. In Latin America and Africa, the shift during the period covered has been especially dramatic. As the preceding discussion of the context of militarization clarifies, it is the new character of the military outlook that creates cause for alarm. The ascent to power of the military or of militarized civilians is accompanied by a broadened sense of purpose for the military. The military and their civilian allies now regard their security task as mainly domestic, a matter of protecting the stability of the developmental process against radical social forces. In other words, militarization is associated, whether wittingly or not, with a specific type of national politics.

In Africa and Asia, trends toward militarization should be associated, in part, with some deferred strains arising out of the decolonization process. The postcolonial state in these regions has often expanded without generally being able to secure a mandate embracing all significant groups encompassed by state. Governance is based on imposed authority usually associated with the ascendancy of given elites, sometimes enjoying support from only certain ethnic components of the whole social order. In most Third World countries, because the military has been willing to exercise control, the strong governance option has prevailed.

In sum, the maps support the generalizations about the trends toward militarization, as well as the subtrends toward rightist variants. Such trends are vectors of change. Some exceptions exist. India's move toward militarized rule with the emergency decrees of 1975 was repudiated at the polls in an election in March of 1977. The revolutionary movement in Iran has also succeeded in eliminating one of the most militarized regimes from the world scene. As of early 1979, it is not yet clear what will emerge in its place beyond the probability of some form of Islamic Republic. Whether the new governing process in Iran will be able to sustain the democratic expectations of its own movement remains in doubt. Nevertheless, some significant gains have been already achieved in the direction of reducing the militarized character of the relation between government and citizenry in Iran.

There are several significant implications of the cumulative trend toward repressive rule for the global community. First of all, militarization encourages the emergence of strong states in many Third World countries. Secondly, where state power is strong and the government sustained in power by military control, political consequences are certain to result. Thirdly, militarist Third World governments will not lend genuine support to global disarmament initiatives as their links of dependency to one or the other superpower

tend to be strong. This orientation works against pursuing the more natural Third World interests in denuclearization and disarmament. Fourthly, the existence of a large majority of Third World governments that affirm the traditional virtues of sovereignty and statism assures the absence of any serious challenge directed at prevailing ideas about the pace and shape of global reform.

This situation creates confusion. On the one hand, militarist governments may push Third World solidarity on a wide variety of limited issues so as to secure a better relative position, especially in economic terms, for themselves in the world system. On the other hand, however, their framework of operations is bounded by traditional statism that includes endorsement of the war system and antipathy to supranationalist or pacificist lines of thinking. As such, world order values associated with peace, economic well-being, human rights, ecological balance, and positive global identity are not likely to win support from such a leadership. Advocacy of a new international economic order is not *necessarily* associated with seeking a just and peaceful world order. And, indeed, an NIEO achieved under militarist auspices would not necessarily help the poor satisfy their basic needs in the near future, even if it did help poor states improve their relative trading and development position.

In conclusion, alongside of the continuing development and spread of the entire spectrum of weaponry goes the expansion of militarized governance patterns. The latter augments the former in several damaging respects. While militarism in the Third World is partly a reflection of domestic factors, it is also a consequence of international factors, especially the imperial geopolitics of the United States and the capitalist domination of international economic institutions and procedures.

To reverse this trend toward militarized authoritarianism is difficult. It depends, first of all, on a deepening domestic opposition to militarism and authoritarianism, perhaps precipitated by economic failures that extend the deprivations experienced by the poor to large sectors of the middle classes. There is some indication that the moderation of authoritarian rule in Brazil has occurred as a response to a narrowing base of political support, with prominent middle class defections,especially among business and professional groups. Whether the approach to moderation will restore levels of support is likely to determine if it will persist or be superseded by more severe authoritarian tactics. In Iran, also, we observe the failure of severe authoritarian rule to sustain stability despite a plenitude of capital, with a falling away of support for the Shah on the part of even those urban sectors that had been the beneficiary of his policies. The tactical response in such a situation by the rulers is either cosmetic liberalization or making authoritarian rule even more severe, or an incoherent embrace of both postures, as in Iran in 1978. None of

these responses worked as the domestic balance shifted strongly against dynastic rule while the revolutionary movement constantly broadened its popular base until the repressive regime in early January was isolated from any base of support in the society and collapsed.

Secondly, overcoming militarization of domestic politics will be helped by a more 'progressive' cast of politics in the leading countries of the world, and as extended to their foreign policy. Deference by the powerful to the dynamics of self–determination by the weak, and restraint in arms sales and supplies would contribute to the goals of demilitarization of Third World polities. Here, again, the Iranian case is instructive, since the revolution succeeded despite the support for the Shah given by all major outside states, including especially the United States. It remains obscure at this point as to whether the revolutionary success will do more to encourage similar processes elsewhere or to create new counterrevolutionary pressure and tactics to avoid repetition of the Iranian revolution elsewhere. The dynamic of contradictory influence can, perhaps, be best observed in the years ahead in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Thirdly, reversing militarization would be encouraged by significantly altering the lending practices of the United Nations family of economic assistance agencies like the World Bank IMF, as well as of their regional counterparts. In particular, loans and credit would have to be linked more closely to a needs–oriented development strategy and divorced from the current insistence that even poor societies must adopt fiscally 'responsible' programs that impair a government's capacity to be an active agent of social reform or be cut off as a recipient of economic support. Furthermore, the goals of moderate, democratic political order would be served by reliance on some kind of 'clean hands' assessment of each governmental applicant for international economic assistance based on its observance of minimum human rights.

VIII. Stalinization

The socialist sector of the First World also suffers from rigid authoritarian rule. The phenomenon of Stalinization suggests the severity of repression during Stalin's period of rule in the Soviet Union. Stalinization, as extended to post–Stalin USSR or to East Europe, Albania and, more problematically, to Yugoslavia refers to the pattern of dictatorial rule in a centralized socialist state in the North (See Map 13).

As is evident, Stalinization has evolved through different stages, surviving even the Khrushchev 'shocks' of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which included revelations of Stalin's crimes and the repudiation of his methods. Yet evidence persists that the authoritarian structure remains

intact, that the secret police (KGB) continue to act as a principal arm of government, and that oppositional activities meet with harsh responses. The Gulag mentality remains the Soviet-style approach to governance.

In Eastern Europe, Stalinization has taken hold to varying degrees, and cannot be correlated directly with the extent of subordination to Moscow. Rumania (and, even more dramatically, Albania) pursue independent lines of national policy, and yet are Stalinized in their style of domestic governance. Hungary, on the other hand, is quite submissive in its international posture and yet has evolved into a fairly moderate polity in the years since its heroic effort to free itself from Soviet domination and Stalinist rule failed in 1956.

There is little consensus or optimism about the future evolution of the Soviet system. Some 'Leninists' like Roy Medvedev believe that liberalization is possible and even necessary, if for no other reason than to overcome the inefficiencies and incompetence of excessive bureaucratic centralism and administrative control.[21] Those pursuing sharper lines of dissent are convinced that the structure of authority is Stalinized (or Leninized), and that nothing short of revolutionary change can end authoritarianism.

The dramatic conclusion is that we have no positive example of a socialist country in the North that has avoided the Stalinization phenomenon. Even Tito's grand repudiation of Soviet hegemony has not been complemented by achieving an open, nonrepressive society at home. Dissenters are repressed, and there is little political space left available to those who would challenge or oppose the main lines of official policy.

The socialist experience in the North, as represented by the communist countries, seems to entail an authoritarian pattern of rule. There are variations in degrees of severity, as between countries and as between different times in a given country. There is neither an ideological tradition nor an empirical instance, as yet, of a nonauthoritarian state emerging out of the world communist movement. The potential spread of Eurocommunism in Western Europe may create a partial exception if communist parties gain power in Italy, Spain, or France. Even if such an eventuality should occur, it will not be accepted as a full test. For one thing, there is the view that Eurocommunists are not socialists at all, but have been coopted to save capitalism from collapse in a period of crisis. Quite opposite is the equally critical view that the liberal concerns of Eurocommunism are a fig leaf to hide the dark side of communist participation in electoral politics, that such liberalism is merely a tactic to fool the voters and that the communist party in each of these countries remains organized around a Stalinist mold.

In conclusion, Stalinization seems to characterize communist party rule in the North. Eurocommunist liberal postures are not yet convincing either

[21]Roy A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1975).

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 13
Stalinized countries

as genuinely socialist or as necessarily antiauthoritarian. The distinction between Stalinization in the North and Leninization in the South may be rather thin, especially in certain countries such as North Korea and Cuba, where the Soviet role has been significant. In addition to levels of development, the geopolitical distance of the Third World from the USSR gives the political processes of these countries relatively greater autonomy than is possible for the states of Eastern Europe.

IX. Trilateralization

It is not only the Third World and the Soviet bloc that exhibit an inability to establish satisfactory governance structures. Challenges directed at democratic practices are occurring in some of the richest, most industrialized countries in the North (See Map 14). These societies are exhibiting a bewildering array of strains ranging from the prevalence of street crime, drug use, and mental disorder to the disclosure of corrupt practices by top leaders. Various forms of terrorism are rampant. Questions of 'governability' have been raised. Can democratic societies achieve sufficient discipline to deal with the multiple challenges of the contemporary world? The Trilateral Commission has been sensitive enough to this weakening of the democratic fabric among capitalist members of the advanced industrial world to give a much publicized study on this theme the revealing title *The Crisis of Democracy*.[22]

In effect, Trilateralists are 'pessimistic' about whether democratic values, associated with democratic notions of participation and dissent, remain compatible with overriding priorities of disciplined behavior by the citizenry as a whole. In effect, doubts are raised as to whether the demands on government can be matched by capabilities to respond successfully to the agenda of discontent and array of disorders. One of the main authors in the Trilateral Commission project, Samuel Huntington, is of the opinion that 'In the past decade, we've swung too far to the extreme of challenging authority, dismantling it, exposing all of its abuses – important and unimportant, real and imagined.'[23] Part of the problem, according to the Introduction of Trilateral Commission Report, is with alienated intellectuals 'who assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy

[22]Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York, N.Y., New York University Press, 1975).

[23]Interview, *U.S. News and World Report*, 8 March, 1976, p. 51.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Map 14

Trilateralized countries



and with the subservience of democratic government to "monopoly capitalism"'.[24] Such critics are derided in the report, because they write and criticize without having to accept the burdens of responsibility for practical affairs. These 'value-oriented intellectuals who often devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions... constitute a challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at least, as serious as those posed by the aristocratic cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties'.[25] This trend is reinforced, according to the Report, by counter-cultural tendencies questioning traditional beliefs in materialism, individualist gratifications, and technocratic approaches to social issues. Such tendencies 'pose an additional new problem for democratic government in terms of its ability to mobilize its citizens for the achievement of social and political goals and to impose discipline and sacrifice upon its citizens in order to achieve those goals'.[26] These various pressures, in their cumulative effect, shape the central issue for the Trilateralists: 'The demands on democratic government grow, while the capacity of democratic government stagnates. This, it would appear, is the central dilemma of the governability of democracy which has manifested itself in Europe, North America, and Japan in the 1970's.'[27]

This assessment of democratic prospects is striking for its failure to address the merits of the disaffection. It is a managerial inquiry that is fully consistent with the overriding concern of the Trilateral Commission with the management of threats to the international *status quo*. Zbigniew Brzezinski, then the Executive Director of the Commission, observes, in an introductory note to the Report, that 'The Trilateral Commission decided to undertake this project because it has felt, rightly in my view, that the vitality of our political systems is a central precondition for the shaping of a stable international order and for the fashioning of more cooperative relations among our regions.'[28] And 'vitality' is explained by Brzezinski as 'the subtle interrelationship between liberty and responsibility'. 'Responsibility' is a code word for popular acquiescence and discipline, for confining demands to marginal changes. Part of this mission, according to the Trilateralist vision of the future, is to shape a *global* sequel to the uncertainties and tensions of the existing *international* order. The self-serving claim is that only Trilateralist leadership of a coherent sort can accomplish this transition in an effective and beneficial fashion. The Third World is far too poor and weak, and the Soviet Union is

[24] *The Crisis of Democracy* (f.n. 22), p. 6.
[25] *The Crisis* (f.n. 22), pp. 6–7.
[26] *The Crisis* (f.n. 22), p. 7.
[27] *The Crisis* (f.n. 22), p. 9.
[28] *The Crisis* (f.n. 22), p. 1.

disabled by its refusal to participate in the world economy in a regular way and by the rigidity of its bureaucratic approach to policymaking. Only a Trilateralist concert of capitalist societies possesses the mixture of material capabilities, innovative skills, and managerial disposition needed to produce a global order that would bring disruptive tendencies under control. Such a global order would also work to stabilize prevailing hierarchies of privilege and power on the national level.

Of course, Trilateralists are increasingly concerned, especially in Europe where economic pressures have raised the political questions in a more acute form, about the challenge of Eurocommunism. This challenge, as the European section of the Report makes clear, is seen as one consequence of the failure of liberal forces controlling the apparatus of state power to provide bureaucratic efficiency or to meet mass demands for social justice.[39] At stake, of course, are the capitalist economic premises of these political systems, not necessarily their democratic orientation. Indeed, the communist parties in Italy, France and Spain, long stigmatized as Stalinist, have to varying degrees emphasized values of decentralization, civil liberties, and popular participation more than have their liberal adversaries who are trapped by the technocratic centralism of the present stage of capitalist operations.

The Commission report fails to examine whether 'value-oriented intellectuals' might not perceive some glaring deficiencies beneath the glitter of the Trilateral world. Signs of disintegration abound everywhere – the violence-drenched 'entertainment', the colossal waste, the malnutrition of overdevelopment, the rising cancer rates, the desperate search for 'meaning', the apocalyptic and postapocalyptic cultural mood. These symptoms are indicative of cultural disorder, a circumstance far too deep to be handled by a shift away from democratic traditions.

The crisis of democratic societies reflects the interplay of internal and external factors. Materialist expectations 'handled' by welfare state programs contribute to bureaucratic overload, mass disillusionment, and an intrusive state. The logic of national security in the nuclear age intensifies these pressures, especially in the United States, but also in NATO countries, where large standby forces ready for immediate deployment and backed up by a constant stream of technological innovations unavoidably build up a military-industrial complex and a permanent 'pre-war' mentality. Beyond this, economic interdependencies on many fronts require unprecedented efforts to cushion the impact of diverse national priorities, efforts made more complex by the tension between an American-led ideology of free trade and a political process on the state level that is nationalistic at all times and

[39]For something to a similar effect, see Jean-Francois Revel, *The Totalitarian Temptation* (New York: Doubleday, 1977).

protectionist during periods of pressure. These managerial imperatives coincide with the emerging agenda of ecological interdependencies that are, in some instances, planetary in scope (nuclear testing, ocean pollution, ozone depletion), an agenda that often squarely challenges national sovereign rights on behalf of global well-being (e.g. flag-of-convenience tanker registration, reliance on cheap pesticides). Technological developments (computerized police administration, centralized and vulnerable energy systems such as associated with nuclear technology) also create the pretexts and instrumentalities for repressive practices.

These 'structural' pressures lead me, also, to question the capacity of Trilateral governance systems to respond adequately or to satisfy their own populations. Yet, to attribute these issues to 'ungovernability', to an excess of democracy, or to the irritating influence of value-oriented intellectuals suggests a reactionary political 'fix' to a series of challenges that call for a more profound process of transformation and adjustment.[30] The Trilateral Commission is busy 'framing' a suspect to protect 'the cover' of the real culprit – namely, an obsolete and exploitative set of social, political, and economic institutions, reinforced by self-destructive belief systems that sustain in power transnational elites with a vested interest in the existing structure of power and wealth. Unless these underlying elements of authority systems are reconstituted in a more progressive direction, including the safeguarding of precious democratic achievements, the prospects for the Trilateral world are dismal on every score. In the name of 'governability', one will expect increasing abridgements of democratic procedures, relegating their operation to a formal level. In the United States, the informal regimentation of the main political parties and network TV effectively discourage fundamental questioning of the *status quo*.

One disquieting manifestation of this pre-authoritarian mentality appeared in an alarming context – nuclear weapons policy. In a volume of the 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations on this topic, its editor notes blandly:

> In the long run, the existence of nuclear weapons could fundamentally alter government-citizen relationships. If, over time, the need of the governments to field expensive deterrent forces is not appreciated by citizens who no longer sense a real nuclear threat, popular support for the maintenance of forces could fade – and governments might feel themselves compelled to provide for deterrence without the consent of the governed.[31]

This formulation is noteworthy for the way 'the need of the governments' is

[30] This is, of course, the guiding premise of the World Order Models Project. My own views are spelled out in *A Study of Future Worlds*, note 1, and in *This Endangered Planet: Proposals and Prospects for Human Survival* (New York: Random House, 1971).

[31] David Gompert *et al.*, *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), pp. 4–5.

given objective status, whereas the popular failure of appreciation by the citizenry is regarded as nothing more than subjective sentiment.

In sum, Trilateralist outlooks remain in ascendence throughout the non-communist advanced industrial countries. These anxieties about governability are founded on objective realities. They mistake, however, the symptom for the disease and prescribe cures that are largely irrelevant. The Trilateralist response fails to address the need for profound economic, political, and cultural adjustments, including a transnational movement to create a just world. As such, it fails to address the intertwined challenges posed by domestic and global developments.

X. Assessment

The argument of this paper is based on an interpretation of trends toward increasing authoritarianism in national governance structures throughout the world. These trends are expressed in distinct form in each national situation. However, five crystallizations of these trends have been suggested: Brazilianization, Leninization, Praetorianization, Stalinization, and Trilateralization. The pattern of repressive rule is disclosed in two different forms: first, by a table of countries, classifying each in relation to authoritarian and pre-authoritarian forms of governance; secondly, a series of maps that indicate the trends with respect to each category of governance. The purpose here is to provide a general sense of political life within the national societies whose states give structure to the world political system and whose governments determine what it is realistic to expect with regard to global reform. Brazilianization is characteristically related to the dynamics of capital formation. The governing elite in a Third World country rejects the option of drastic structural reform (especially dissolving traditional classes of privilege) and chooses, instead, to rely upon repressive modes of structural maintenance. Brazilianization is also a consequence of the influence of transnational capital interests, especially their relentless quest for a reliable climate for trade and investment in Third World societies. Praetorianization represents the imposition of order via arbitrary force in a society without evolved political institutions and traditions and without a significant modern economic sector. Leninization evolves out of the communist approach to the exercise of state power and to the relationship between the government and the people based on structures of bureaucratic dominance. The authoritarian tendency is also reinforced by the perceived need to defend revolutionary governments against a mixture of internal and external adversaries with counterrevolutionary designs. Stalinization has evolved out of Leninization in the Soviet Union,

involving the pathological extension of Leninist attitudes toward the formation of a hard state in the postrevolutionary period and generating structures and practices of repressive rule that have not only outlived Stalin, but have persisted despite the explicit Soviet repudiation of his dictatorial methods. As well, Stalinization has been insinuated into Soviet hegemonic relations with East European socialist countries. Trilateralization is a pre-authoritarian disposition of liberal democracies in the advanced industrial sector of the world economy, provoked by essentially the same factors as Brazilianization, but in the context of different political traditions, a more ascendant global status and a more affluent and indifferent citizenry.

In three of these five contexts economic considerations appear to play the decisive role. Because of underdevelopment and mass poverty, Brazilianization does seem to be decisively shaped by class struggle on the domestic level and is reinforced by the geopolitics of world capitalism (i.e. state interests and MNCs). The Iran case is an anomaly to the extent that oil wealth gave the Shah's regime a special option of liberalizing rapidly without shaking up class structure. A mixture of greed and indifference, however, led toward the embrace of tight authoritarian rule even without the presence of any strong case of functional necessity.

Leninization may, in some settings, reflect the difficulty of maintaining order in the face of persisting economic austerity, an austerity often made more extreme by the hostility of the capitalist sector of the world economy. Yet, on balance, authoritarian excesses in Third World socialist countries reflect ideological and normative insensitivities in mainstream Marxist-Leninist thinking and practice (possibly avoidable, although as yet untested, in variants of Trotskyism), including a naive theory of the state and an undervaluation of individual rights as legally protected by independent institutions.

Trilateralization is explicitly a quest for new international structures enabling separate capitalist polities to maintain their growth in the face of a variety of domestic and international challenges. Its authoritarian implications reflect the conviction that it may be necessary to police the domestic scene to overcome obstruction and disorder. Capitalist activities are increasingly transnational in their critical dimensions, typified by the role of MNCs and by dependence on imported oil, but, as with Third World settings, a prerequisite to success is stability at levels of social adjustment that contain labor demands, keep investment profitable, and reward the managerial elite.

It should be understood that each of these authoritarian patterns is itself in a constant process of evolution, leading to frequent shifts in tactics, style, and tone. Each of these polities is beset by a variety of tensions and counterpressures that assume their own distinctive coloration. It is characteristic for Brazil, for instance, to experiment periodically with 'decompression', as its leadership maneuvers to maintain or extend its political base that is

being eroded by repressive measures, which are particularly resented when economic discontent deepens or spreads. A Brazilianized regime oscillates between its central reliance on repressive violence to assure stability and its desire to gain some measure of legitimacy by way of popular support that will alone give it longer-term durability. Such an impulse for legitimacy may be augmented also by external considerations, including outside pressures from the international community, including the United Nations. Liberal American presidencies also may put pressure on their allies, as has occurred via the human rights diplomacy associated with the initial phases of the Carter Administration. As a result, a loosening of repressive policies occurs from time to time, accompanied even by promises of a return to civilian normalcy, or its cosmetic equivalent. Similarly, Leninized and Stalinized regimes zigzag in their degree of repression, depending on a variety of personality and situational factors. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to stem liberalizing tendencies disclosed an outer limit for de-Stalinization, at least within the immediate Soviet orbit for that time period. Elsewhere the potentialities for de-Stalinization, de-Leninization have not been tested to any appreciable degree as yet, but hopeful signs are present, especially in Cuba. Trilateral polities have not yet moved across authoritarian thresholds; Europe, and possibly Japan, may evolve progressive, nonauthoritarian options in the interim, but the pressures for imposed rightist rule are mounting rapidly.

North America, with its strong democratic traditions, wealth and power, may withstand these pressures longer than most, partly because its primacy in the Trilateral world allows it to divert some of the worst effects of these global economic pressures to its weaker, more dependent allies (e.g. the relative effects of OPEC pricing policies since 1973 on national economies). From another angle of perspective, the United States situation is the most desperate – 'When I look at this country, a modern-day Babylon that is fast approaching its twilight, and see it wallowing in decadence, corruption, immorality and banality, I am proud to realize that absolutely none of it is of my making', writes one Afro-American.[82] The most immediate vulnerability of the United States to authoritarian solutions, at present, seems connected with a mood of cultural despair, reinforced by economic and political stagnancy.

[82] Letter to the editor, *Time*, 18 July, 1977.

XI. Conclusions from a world order perspective

These drifts toward authoritarianism suggest three types of world order conclusions:

(1) An inability of the state to achieve humane governance structures in any principal sector of world society;

(2) A powerful set of convergent inhibitions on system-change on those transformative strategies that might establish a humane governance structure for the planet as a whole;

(3) A pattern generally unfavorable to the realization of world order values within the present structure of international society.

Each of these conclusions are briefly discussed below.

1. Critique of the state

Although the state remains the principal framework for the political organization of life on the planet, its performance and prospects suggest that its predominance, at least in present forms, is generally incapable of achieving humane patterns of governance, i.e. patterns in which basic human rights of an economic, social, political, and cultural character are upheld. Of course, comparison has to be based on whether alternative modes of political organization with a greater potential for human governance exist, and whether, where, and in what respects the state is declining or increasing in its value-realizing capacities. Some general normative claims have been advanced on behalf of the state's performance. Tom Farer, for instance, writes, 'As for economic security, it seems plain to me that governments are doing better today than at any time in the past.'[33] And certainly it should be appreciated that the state as a global phenomenon is a relatively recent development, superseding imperial modes of organization that have been dominant in most parts of the world.

Nevertheless, the negative generalization holds even in the Third World to the extent that governing coalitions must rely on authoritarian prerogatives to sustain order. Since this condition obtains so widely, the most elaborate normative claim that can be advanced on behalf of the state as a framework for national life is that it has displayed an impressive capacity to assure an increasing measure of national autonomy, especially for the states liberated from colonial rule in the last several decades. For these societies, the state as a

[33]Tom J. Farer, 'The greening of the globe: a preliminary appraisal of the World Order Models Project (WOMP)', *International Organization 31*, 1977.

political actor has achieved important goals, and it is regarded by all parts of the political spectrum as a positive phenomenon. Such governing elites are not yet ready to relinquish their sovereignty to any external actor, whatever the global rationale.

A world order critique of the state does not entail a call for its elimination as a form of political order. It argues in favor of eroding the dominance of the state, especially in the more industrialized societies, by enhancing governance structures of both international and intranational character. This process can and should proceed initially in the countries of the North, and then gradually extend to the Third World.

It should also be noted that authoritarian tendencies seem more inevitable in large states and in governance structures that seek to impose unified rule over ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse and recalcitrant population groupings. At the same time, such small states as Albania, Cambodia, Chile, and Paraguay suggest that severe repression cannot be associated only with large-sized states. It is possible to imagine the rapid proliferation of small states alongside the confederalizing of large states as together satisfying national preconditions for humane polities.

2. Inhibitions on system-change

An attribute of authoritarian tendencies is to close off political space for innovation. By its character, such governance structures are not receptive to proposals for change that do not emerge from the supreme leader or supportive technocrats. The ruling elite, whether or not dominated by a dictatorial figure, tends to be short-sighted and mean-spirited and to assume the same for others. One effect is to accent the centrifugal features of statism. Furthermore, Brazilianized, Praetorianized, Leninized, Stalinized, and Trilateralized governance structures rely on force to sustain rule, accord great influence to their respective military establishments (and its civilian allies), and develop formidable internal security bureaucracies that are exceedingly threatened by transnational goals and outlooks.

Trilateralists do, indeed, seek a systematic adjustment that depends on the development of a more integrated global economy. Such an economy would be structured to assure access to critical resources (above all, oil and gas), facilitate transnational flows of capital, and provide MNCs with assured access and stable overseas conditions for planning and the conduct of business operations. Trilateralists also emphasize the importance of controlling domestic wage pressure, inflation, and parochial distortions of the market. Given the context of Brazilianization – the principal non-Trilateral sphere of operations for international capitalism – considerations of order

take precedence over the alleged concern for social justice. Labor unrest, terrorist activity, or socialist policies threaten the viability of profitable overseas operations by the MNCs as well as imperil the reliability of international banking. Avoiding these outcomes is accorded priority. From this perspective, President Carter's human rights diplomacy seems either stupid (undermining primary interests), or cynical (intended to revive cold war, mobilize domestic support for an activist foreign policy, confuse and solicit world public opinion), or provincial (ignoring patterns of economic deprivation). As of early 1979, the Carter Administration has virtually abandoned human rights as an explicit goal of American foreign policy, and has been busy fighting off attacks from its critics, including Henry Kissinger, that Iran was 'lost', in part, due to Carter's ill-advised liberalizing pressures on the Shah.

An essential conclusion is that authoritarian tendencies on a national level are not conducive to generating a climate for progressive types of global reform. Such a climate will depend on the emergence of humane governance structures on a state level that will emerge only if populist pressures and struggles to achieve such structures are successful. Authoritarianism by its nature is not humane (although it may be benevolent in certain aspects, e.g. provision of material needs), and by its logic and operation is antagonistic to populist pressures, although its policies may seek to reduce these by cooptation in various forms. Also, the preoccupation of authoritarian leaders with effective control makes them ill-disposed to share power and authority with wider governance structures that cannot be controlled. Finally, the authoritarian impulse is also closely associated with centralization (to assure control). Domestic militarization of political power is, therefore, by its essential nature antithetical to downward power-sharing of the sort implied by confederalizing visions of preferred national governance structures or to outward power-sharing by way of transnational security arrangements leading toward disarmament.

3. World order values

The value implications of the various forms of authoritarianism are too complicated to specify. There are, in addition, major national, regional, cultural, ideological, and religious variations. Some very schematic correlations can be discerned to suggest the patterns that underlie the four categories of authoritarian states.

Brazilianization and World Order Values[34]

Nonviolence and peace (V_1)	Violence as central to problem-solving
	Increased arms acquisition
	'Security' identified with military strength
	Military bias of bureaucracy
	Antidisarmament perspectives
Economic well-being (V_2)	Economic performance measured by growth rather than needs criteria
	Income and regional disparities accentuated
	Large proportion of labor force 'marginalized'
Social and political justice (V_3)	Denial of civil liberties
	Increase in repression
	Erosion of constitutional order (courts, legislature)
	Low levels of legitimacy
Ecological quality (V_4)	Growth criteria tend to diminish concern for conservation, pollution
	Emphasis on capital-intensive technology produces urban 'sprawl', decay
Participation and humane governance (V_5)	Demobilization produces apathy, despair
	Statism interferes with growth of global identity, runs counter to global cooperation, solutions

Leninized forms of authoritarian rule do not have as generally an adverse impact on world order values. Indeed, several Third World Leninized societies, depending on leadership style, amplitude of resource base, and political serenity, have remarkable records with respect to economic well-being (V_2). In addition, the absence of a profit motive seems to have produced a somewhat better, although inconsistent, record by socialist countries on environmental issues, at least as compared to their Brazilianized counterparts. Praetorianized polities also tend to have a consistently adverse impact on world order values, although, if left-oriented, they tend to do better on economic well-being (V_2) than their right-oriented counterparts. Also, as compared to Brazilianized, Leninized, Stalinized, and Trilateralized polities, those that are Praetorianized do less environmental harm (V_4), not because their value sensitivities are more acute, but as a consequence of their lower stage of industrial development.

Both superpowers, leaders of the Stalinized and Trilateralized segments of the industrial heartland of the globe, pose by far the most severe threats to world order values through their preparations for strategic nuclear war, their arms sales policies, their drain of world resources, and their responsibility for generating much of the pressure building up in the biosphere. Citizen's movements in the Trilateral sector have mounted pressures on environmental

[34]For discussion of these world order values, see Falk (f.n. 1), pp. 11–39.

and safety issues, resulting in more environmental protection in these countries than in Stalinized countries. Although elusive, provision of jobs for everyone in socialist societies may lessen one dimension of alienation, yet neither system seems capable of providing meaningful work for much of its population.

XI. What can be done

Let us assume the basic accuracy of the preceding analysis: Authoritarian tendencies are prevalent except in the Trilateral sector – where cultural decay and political and economic decline have created a pre-authoritarian context. Trilateralists are seeking to solve 'the crisis of democracy' by forging a globalist concert of capitalist economies; governing elites will generally oppose or ignore progressive and drastic demands for global reform, and increasingly concentrate their energies and resources on arresting their own relative decline.

Despite this bleak outlook, there are constructive responses available to those who believe in system-change guided by WOMP values. The overall goal is to establish patterns of humane governance at all levels of social organization (from family to planet).

1. Demystification

This calls for assessing trends as accurately as possible, with due weight given to structural factors, so as to reveal pressures upon democratic prospects that flow from the interplay of domestic and international sources. Especially important is a continuous critique and exposure of spurious forms of global reform, such as the managerial fixes envisioned by Trilateralists. Also crucial is the exposure of the liberal fallacy that governing structures are neutral and can be moved by persuasive politics incrementally in the direction of world order values. The evidence suggests overwhelmingly that every apparent step forward is likely to have at least one step backward, and very likely more than one. There is no other way to gain support for a given reform within a modern state bureaucracy, and without such support innovative steps are unlikely to be taken or implemented. At the minimum, it is important to be on guard to notice what is bargained away within the bureaucracy to obtain the support of the military establishment (or enough of it) to achieve a given arms control of initiative.

2. Positive currents

Depict and support those subsidiary developments that make the overall picture less bleak: the renewal of democratic forms in India, Spain, Greece; the successes of liberation struggles in Iran, Africa; the possibility of anti-Stalinist forms of socialist rule in Western Europe; the possibility of de-Leninization in Third World socialist countries; the growth of dissent within the Soviet Union; the salience of human rights; the fracturing of large states via various types of separatism, including the withdrawal of loyalty from central institutions; the persistence and maturation of counter-cultural activism, including resistance communities within the Trilateral world; the antinuclear movement; the early stages of a Third World movement linking development goals to disarmament and peace.

3. Actions, activities

Support human rights, broadly defined to encompass economic and cultural issues and possibly expanded to include ecological subject matter. Emphasize popular sovereignty with respect to human rights – namely, that rights inhere inalienably in the peoples of the world and that governing structures and leaders lose their legitimacy to the extent that they fail to uphold these rights. Lend specific support to individuals and movements of dissent and resistance, especially to those who espouse progressive goals associated with democratic forms of socialism. Take advantage of official campaigns for human rights launched for propaganda purposes, but also expose the negative side effects (e.g. reviving cold war, mobilizing domestic support for interventionary diplomacy, distracting attention from repressive features of imperialist global roles).

Support, similarly, demilitarizing initiatives in all contexts. Link disarmament agenda with other world order values, especially initiating the process of demilitarization of domestic societies in the North, possibly by slowing down the arms race and, later on, reversing it.

Underneath a specific agenda is the reshaping of political consciousness. Above all, we need a growing number of influential individuals and groups who will think, feel, act like planetary citizens, as well as fulfill traditional roles as loyal participants in local and national community processes. Possibly, too, the United Nations can be weaned gradually away from the state system and begin to serve the cause of humanity as a whole, not in some sentimental sense, but rather to fulfill a mandate to protect the planet from the adverse effects of the clash of sovereign national wills.

Postscript: a note on the Brazilian experience

Brazil is, of course, the exemplary case of Brazilianization. The broad analytic contours can be reinforced now by a brief sketch of the Brazilian experience to date.

Brazil, long perceived as the sleeping giant of Latin America, has in actuality been awakening since the Vargas period. Somewhat misleadingly, the rest of the world has associated the Brazilian awakening almost exclusively with the move toward militarization initiated by a coup on 31 March, 1964. In key respects, of course, the story of Brazil underlies the phenomenon of 'Brazilianization'. First, the decisive impetus toward militarization came from an internal developmental crisis, involving an inflationary spiral, labor and student unrest, economic stagnancy, and an uncertain investment climate. Second, the seizure of power by the military on behalf of capitalist interests was necessary to head off a popular drift toward radicalization and socialism.

Of course, the Brazilian story is complex and interpreters do not agree on all critical points. There is general agreement that Joao Goulart's government in the 1962–1964 period was being moved to the left in response to increasing demands for policies more favorable to workers and the rural poor. It is also true that the labor challenge was widely held to be responsible for producing instability, via strikes and demonstrations, and that continuing wage demands were helping to generate an inflationary spiral and were threatening the position and prospects of the Brazilian upper and middle classes. In actuality, real wage levels had been declining, and the struggle of labor had the conservative goal of holding their relative position in the social structure. An atmosphere of uncertainty about the future prevailed, discouraging savings and investment. Economic growth was slackening in this period, and this led to a radicalization of popular sector politics, calling into question the viability of capitalism as a means of equitable development. Such a dynamic led entrenched classes to be frightened, especially at a time when the regional mood was dominated by Castro's victory and expansive claims, and helped set the stage for the 1964 coup.[35]

The military coup of 1964 was an ideal situation for the right, as the demand for order seemed to emanate from large segments of the populations. It is thus generally accurate to contend that the overthrow of Goulart was not just a military coup, but was endorsed by the overall climate of political opinion, enjoying the active support and leadership of significant sectors of Brazilian society. The great majority of the people seemed confused and passive and

[35]The analysis of this paragraph reflects the influence of Kenneth Paul Erikson (referred to in f.n. 11).

were easy to neutralize. Even liberal political groupings were ambivalent. The response to the coup by the centrist PSD was reticent and even segments of the syndicalist-influenced PTB welcomed the military takeover. When they fell, President Joao Goulart and his supporters were isolated and defeated men, not only in military but, above all, in political terms.[36]

The Brazilian left (and possibly also the military) was unrealistic about its own power base. Many of the poorest among the urban squatters of *Favelados*, contrary to expectations, actually gave their support to the 1964 coup at first.[37] Outside of organized labor – and even labor was split and its degree of autonomy from the state vastly exaggerated[38] – there were no strongly mobilized social forces ready to defend the constitutional order. The Brazilian military leaders who took power in 1964 were under constant pressure in subsequent years from their own supporters to go further in a repressive direction. There were demands from elements of the military that steps should be taken to neutralize individuals or social forces that might otherwise mount a movement of political opposition. Although never fully claiming the legitimate right to rule, the military rulers have stayed on, and they give every indication of holding tightly the reins of power.

The role of the military was more expansive than seizing power; it was to secure favorable linkage to the world economy so as to enable rapid economic growth based on modernization. Such goals required 'stability' which, in turn, produced 'discipline' and 'demobilization' of the popular sector. The main policies used to achieve 'discipline' involved getting a reliable labor force that would not press 'unreasonable' wage demands, nor resort to strikes or demonstrations. Part of this process of achieving discipline was to perpetuate and enlist the corporatist labor structures that had been created during the Vargas period (1930–1945) on the model of fascist Italy, and had remained intact up through 1964. Goulart's mobilization of labor had depended partly on moving outside the semiofficial state-dominated labor bureaucracy and partly on putting more progressive labor officials in key positions within the bureaucracy. This socially conscious element of labor leadership was quickly purged after 1964 and a state-controlled movement put in its place.

Instead of bargaining wage increases, the process of wage adjustment was entrusted to technocrats who 'computed' the appropriate raise, given the

[36]See Pedreira (f.n. 6), p. 499.

[37]Reactions to the 1964 coup are significantly studied in Janice E. Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janerio* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976).

[38]See Erikson (f.n. 11), pp. 97–130.

overall economic policy of the country. The regressive results are well known. For instance, as Mericle notes:

> Between 1964 and 1966, reduction of the real minimum wage was an important component of the stabilization program. In the eight-year period from March 1966 to April 1974 (during which real per capita GNP increased substantially), the real value of the minimum wage averaged only 68·2 percent of its average and real value in the period from July 1954 to December 1962.[39]

Regressive redistribution of income also occurred in this period, accentuating a preexisting situation of gross disparity of income: 'The top 5 percent of income earners increased their share of total income from 27·4 to 36·3, while the share of the lower 80 percent fell from 45·5 to 36·8 percent.'[40] Schmitter, writing in the early 1970s, believes that the stabilization policies may have led to 'a decline in worker purchasing power in the major industrial center of the country of 64·5 percent since 1958'.[41] Other sectors among the poor have done even worse. Robert McNamara, in 1973, described the Brazilian growth pattern in similar terms:

> In the last decade Brazil's GNP per capita, in real terms, grew by 2·5 percent per year, and yet the share of the national income received by the poorest 40 per cent of the population declined from 10 percent in 1960 to 8 percent in 1970, whereas the share of the richest 5 percent grew from 29 percent to 38 percent during the same period.

Income redistribution occurred, but in a regressive direction. Under these conditions, especially given prior rise of political consciousness, there would be a strong movement of resistance in the absence of an effective system for preventing labor unrest and challenge.

Another feature of Brazil's economic program was to sustain the concentration of investment on the urban industrial sectors, thereby accentuating preexisting urban–rural and regional disparities. The situation of the Brazilian Northeast is especially relevant, given the extent of its abject poverty. Phillipe Schmitter reports figures that show that the Northeast proportion of gross domestic income declined slightly from 14·78% in 1960 to 14·52% in 1968, while the Southeast (including Rio, Sao Paulo) increased its share from 62·77% in 1960 to 63·20% in 1968. Schmitter's intraregional data on income distribution even suggest a regressive tendency. For instance, in the city of Recife the percentage of total income going to the lowest 40% declined from 16·5% to 11·5% in the period from 1960–1967. Schmitter reports that 'In only one of the eight cities did real per capita income rise for the oppressed

[39]See Kenneth S. Mericle, 'Corporatist Control of the Working Class: Authoritarian Brazil since 1964', in Malloy (f.n. note 3), pp. 303–338, on 306.
[40]Mericle (f.n. 39), p. 306.
[41]Schmitter in Stepan, (.n. 2), p. 200.

sector of the population in this oppressed region of the country.'[43] These trends, amid general prosperity for the upper 20%, suggest the insensitivity of the Brazilian regime in this period to the needs of the very poor.

The essence of Brazil's technocratic strategy was to extend state control over the economy, continuing the Vargas heritage of a steadily increasing share of public expenditure in relation to the gross development product (GDP). The government initially tried to improve the relationship between spending and revenue, hoping to cut inflation and restore confidence. The so-called '1964 revolutionaries' had pledged a return to 'sanity' with regard to the economy, as well as an end to 'corruption'. One of the major policy reforms was to make the tax system generate increased revenues for the government. Here, too, although the picture is complicated, it seems clear that the rich were required to actually pay taxes and that the poor were burdened to an even greater degree than previously. Schmitter writes accurately: 'The highly touted "squeezing" of the rich must be placed in context – the poor have been squeezed even harder.'[43] One of the means of squeezing 'the poor' has been indirect taxes that are more regressive in their effects than direct taxes. It is important to note that, despite the original enthusiasm for the regime on the part of those espousing *laissez-faire* economics, the Brazilian experience since 1964 has been frustrating. State control and foreign penetration of the economy have been increasing *vis-a-vis* the private sector, by means of regulation and by the expansion of state-owned enterprise. The logic of economic technocrats in the government bureaucracy has produced a steady consolidation of economic power under state auspices rather than lending stimulus to a competitive market propelled by classical liberal notions. Indeed, the priorities of the technocrats tend to favor 'scale' and capital intensity that seem to work against indigenous private capital as compared to either international capital or state capital.

One further feature of the post-1964 situation in Brazil is the increase in spending for national security (defense, police) purposes and a corresponding decrease in health and welfare spending (educational expenditures remain stable). As Schmitter notes, there is a natural tendency in such a regime to do what is necessary to have 'a satisfied and unified military', as well as a perceived need to build up 'a large internal policeapparatus for informational and security purposes'.[44] From 1964 to 1971, defense spending increased from 14 to 20·4% of federal expenditures, including a high point of 25·1% in 1967. During this period, public health spending declined from 2·5 to

[42]Schmitter (f.n. 2), p. 204. Other reinforcing data are also collected and presented in Schmitter.

[43]Schmitter (f.n. 2), p. 193.

[44]Schmitter (f.n. 2), p. 193.

1·3%, and social welfare from 3·0 to 0·9%. The priorities of the Brazilian leadership are thus clear.

The success of 'the Brazilian miracle' is largely a matter of having translated its policies into a program of contained inflation and sustained economic growth. The following Schmitter table (Table 6) summarizes this record.

It is important to appreciate that, despite the difficult period in the Goulart years, Brazil had enjoyed a much longer period of impressive economic expansion. Norman Gall reports that 'recent calculations indicate that the economy grew in real terms at an annual average rate of 6·1 percent for the entire forty-two year period from 1933 to 1974.'[45] A considerable spur for this growth was a combination of natural resource wealth and cheap energy. Gall suggests that 'Brazil may be the first large country in history to rely almost entirely on the internal combustion engine to develop its economy and to tie together its territory.' In recent decades,'... the automobile, the truck, the tractor, and the helicopter have done for Brazil what the railroad and the reaper did for the United States a century ago.'[46] In the period between 1950 and 1975, auto registrations in Brazil increased from 236 000 to more than 4000 000. In the years between 1970 and 1974, Brazil doubled its car production and has become the first Third World country producing 1000 000 vehicles a year. Tractors have been extensively relied upon to develop mechanized agriculture along the Brazilian frontier, both to produce enough food for the burgeoning domestic population and possibly enough to export as well. Helicopter resource surveys have been used to identify large iron and bauxite deposits in remote jungle regions.

Such a development dynamic was heavily dependent on imported oil, and so Brazil was hit especially hard by the multiple increases in oil prices since 1974. Since then, foreign indebtedness has grown, developmental projects have been receiving budget cuts, some inflationary pressures have reemerged (50% in 1976), and there is some hesitation among capital suppliers. Brazil's development depends on huge investments of capital to open up its frontiers and to develop a domestic nuclear and hydroelectric energy base. Given global economic recession and the high cost of oil imports, it seems likely that more 'austerity' is in the offing for the Brazilian population. At the same time, the Brazilian technocrats have been quite successful in overcoming oil-based trade deficits by taking measures to stimulate Brazilian exports and by substituting barter for currency transactions through the purchasing policies of Interfras, the global subsidiary of Brazil's huge public energy company, Petrobras.

---

[45]Gall (f.n. note 10), p. 46.

[46]Both quotations from Gall (f.n. 10), p. 47.

*Table 6**

Overall economic performance in Brazil, 1960-1971

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1960	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Annual rate of gross economic growth	9·7	10·3	5·3	1·5	2·9	2·7	5·1	4·8	8·4	9·0	9·5	11·3
Annual rate of industrial growth	9·6	10·6	7·8	0·2	5·2	—4·7	11·7	3·0	13·2	1[illegible]·8	11·1	11·2
Annual rate of gross fixed capital formation (as % of GNP)	17·1	17·3	18·1	17·7	16·6	14·8	15·0	14·6	16·8	16·6	—	—
Annual rate of inflation in cost of living (Rio)	29·3	33·2	51·5	70·8	91·4	65·9	41·3	30·5	22·3	22·0	20·9	13·7
Total foreign debt (in $US millions)	3910	3773	4025	3986	3874	4759	5196	3197	3677	44·3	5265	6622
Balance of foreign trade (in $US millions)	—24	111	—90	112	344	655	438	213	26	26	232	—363

*Dash indicates no data available.

Sources: Fundacao-IBGE, Instituto Brasilciro de Estatistica, *Series Estatisticas Retrospectivas*-1970 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1970; Werner Baer and Isaac Kerstenetzky, 'The Brazilian Economy' in *Brazil in the Sixties*, ed. R. Roett (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), pp. 105–46; 'Brazil: Strong Expansion Continues', *BOLSA Review*, no. 68 (August 1972), pp. 428–33; Riordan Roett, 'A Praetorian Army in Politics' in *Brazil in the Sixties*, p. 12. For total foreign debt until 1966, Marco Gomes, 'Delfini Netto: A divida comoestrategia', *Opinion*, no. 5 (4-11 December 1972), pp. 7–8; APEC, *Pre Apecao 72* (Rio de Janeiro: APEC, 1972), p. 107. Compiled in Schmitter (f.n. 2), p. 198.

A concomitant to this course of economic development has been a reliance on repression. Civil liberties have been infringed to a serious degree; labor unions, universities, and political parties have been the principal targets. Torture has been systematically employed, especially in the period after 1968, when student demonstrations and some left terrorists created an atmosphere in which the hard-line view among the military took precedence. Commenting on these tactics, a Brazilian editor writes, 'the months that followed were perhaps the most somber in the political history of the country; a series of kidnappings and terrorists' attacks justified the build-up of a police state and the abolition of civil guarantees, at the same time increasing the importance of the organs of repression and security within the dominant military system.'[47]

The American role in bringing about this Brazilian solution has been analyzed at some length.[48] The official claim, most vividly stated by Lincoln Gordon (US Ambassador to Brazil, 1961–1966) who contended before the Senate in February, 1966 that 'the movement which overthrew President Goulart was a purely, 100 percent – not 99·44 percent – but 100 percent purely Brazilian movement'. Gordon has recently acknowledged that the Embassy knew a coup was in the offing in 1964, but not exactly when, nor did it have any role in planning its execution. At the same time, recently disclosed documents show that a US naval task force, consisting of an aircraft carrier, six destroyers, and four petroleum tankers, was dispatched to Brazilian waters on 31 March, but ordered to turn back on 2 April. Lincoln Gordon has recently written that nothing comparable to the Dominican intervention was contemplated by such a maneuver as the forces sent 'would have been totally inadequate for any such purpose'.[49] But then, when Gordon explains their role, he virtually concedes the position of those who claim that the Americans, at the very least, stood behind the coup leaders:

> The task force was intended to make possible a limited form of American action in a particular hypothetical contingency, a civil war with Brazil divided on geographic lines, the forces evenly matched, and with one side recognized by us. In that hypothesis, the task force would have had three purposes: (a) to provide logistical support, especially in petroleum products, to the side we believed to represent moderation and democracy; (b) to discourage the opposing side through the showing of the American flag on a powerful vessel; and (c) to assist if necessary on the evacuation of American citizens from regions involved in civil combat.[50]

---

[47]Pedreira (f.n. 6), p. 502.

[48]For a detailed analysis of American role, see Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Phila., Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

[49]See *Washington Post*, 8 March, 1977.

[50]Gordon in *Washington Post*.

As Gordon acknowledges that at the time 'no effort was made to disguise our relief at Goulart's departure', it seems clear which side the United States would have taken had a confrontation developed. Note also that 'moderation and democracy' are associated in the official American mind with a group of anti-communist generals rather than with a constitutionally elected civilian government.

The American pattern of overt diplomatic and economic support, once the Costello Branco military regime ascended to power in 1964, is well known: immediate diplomatic recognition, economic assistance, encouragement of foreign investment. Since the political changeover in 1964, the Brazilian assets of US multinational corporations have multiplied sixfold and are now valued at $4 billion.[51] American support for the Brazilian developmental pattern has been unflagging, even during the worst interludes of repressive rule. Brazil has been invoked as 'a model' for 'healthy' patterns of Third World development. And Brazil has been increasingly viewed as a junior partner of the American-led global imperial partnership. Kissinger's visit in 1975 promised the Brazilians 'a special relationship' that included a consultative role in the formation of global policy.

At the same time, some unexpected developments have occurred, undermining the extent of US influence over Brazilian behavior. Brazil's expansion has led it to diversify its trading patterns, the United States becoming proportionately less important, Japan and Europe more so. The same pattern is evident in relation to arms supplies. More striking is Brazil's emphasis on good relations with OPEC and with the Third World. The dependence of the Brazilian economy on imported oil is undoubtedly a major factor in this evolving 'pragmatic ecumenicism', but also evident is a commitment to nationalist goals of autonomy. American diplomatic leadership has endured several 'shocks' from Brazilian independence on foreign policy – support for self-determination in Angola and Mozambique, insistence on the enormous nuclear deal with West Germany over American objections, and support in the UN for the anti-zionist resolution.

In turn, Carter's human rights emphasis has led Brazil to renounce its right to receive some $50 million in credits for military purchases in fiscal year 1978.[52] It seems evident that the 'sub-imperial' role of Brazil is real to the extent of serving to oppose Latin American radicalism and to encourage militarized governance associated with state capitalism, but it is simplistic to assume that this role is coincident with American global interests in other settings. The Brazilian leadership has made clear its own quite separate ambitions extending to regional superpower status that could eventually

[51] Gall (f.n. 10), p. 45.
[52] *New York Times*, 6 March, 1977, p. 11.

seek to banish the US from South America. In these respects, Braziiianization threatens the American dream of a liberal internationalist economic and political order centered in Washington. Even American business interests report being 'puzzled' by the confusing paradox of Brazilian foreign economic policy that seeks developmental capital from overseas and yet imposes heavy regulatory constraints on foreign investors.